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Abstract
In Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos
introduces a theory of spatial justice that takes into consideration the agential capabilities of
nonhuman legal actors. However, in an effort to decenter the human legal subject,
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos argues that the co-constitutivity of law and space (the
lawscape), as the site where (human and nonhuman) legal bodies take shape, cannot be
mediated through the political. In response to this claim, I argue that spatial justice is an
inherently political project, and I identify the practice of spatial justice (or performing spatial
justice) as a means of understanding how to engage the political aspects of this posthuman
perspective on justice and law. In my final chapter, I compare this theory of spatial justice
with Indigenous law to demonstrate how spatial justice is performed through practices of
Indigenous resurgence.

Keywords
spatial justice, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Indigenous resurgence, Indigenous
law, John Borrows, posthumanism, legal geography, social justice
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Summary for Lay Audience
This project considers the challenges posed by nonhuman legal actors to conventional forms
of legal subjectivity. Drawing on the theoretical contributions of Andreas PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos, I suggest a practice of spatial justice rooted in the relationship between human
and nonhuman agents. In support of this approach, I conduct a comparative analysis of this
practice of spatial justice and Indigenous law, in particular as discussed in the writings of
John Borrows.
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Introduction
“The quasi-logical presupposition of an identity between mental space (the
space of the philosophers and epistemologists) and real space creates an abyss
between the mental sphere on one side and the physical and social spheres on
the other. From time to time some intrepid funambulist will set off to cross the
void, giving a great show and sending a delightful shudder through the
onlookers. By and large, however, so-called philosophical thinking recoils at
the mere suggestion of any such salto mortale.”
Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space

In Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos
takes a salto mortale by proposing a co-constitutivity of law and space that recognizes the
centrality of material agency, and introduces a new dimension to the concept of spatial
justice. This conceptualization of spatial justice pushes the boundaries of legal
subjectivity to reveal the role of nonhuman or more-than-human actors in legal processes,
and to provide an introduction to what a posthumanist theory of justice might look like. I
argue this conceptualization of spatial justice makes a substantial contribution to political
thinking as well by introducing the idea that these posthuman legal assemblages can
perform spatial justice.
The co-constitutivity of law and space is a concept introduced by legal geographers to
describe how laws and regulations influence everyday life, and in particular, how they
limit or facilitate forms of political resistance. However, while this approach engages
with the idea that law is materially expressed, oftentimes nonhuman agents are sidelined
in order to foreground the social and political implications of law’s spatiality.
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos adopts the idea that law and space are mutually
constitutive, but he focuses on the role played by nonhuman legal agents in shaping this
relationship. However, in order to posit a posthumanist theory of spatial justice and
distinguish this project from prior formulations of spatial justice, PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos claims that the co-constitutivity of law and space, which he names the
lawscape (a tautology of law and space), is not mediated by the political. According to
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, focusing on the political dimension of this relationship
detracts from a properly spatial and material analysis of law because it centers it on
humanist concerns, like social process and power relations. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos
recognizes that a posthumanist theory of justice must interrogate the question of legal
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agency in novel ways, as there is no human liberal subject that can exercise its will, but
rather assemblages (or ‘situated’ collectivities) that produce it. However, I argue that
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos also shows that agency is articulated through these
assemblages, and in a sense, gives us an idea of what a politics of spatial justice might
entail. More specifically, I argue that a legal assemblage’s ability to reorient the
lawscape, which is the first step towards spatial justice, demonstrates that there is a form
of agential capability which acknowledges that assemblages engage in political practice.
The legal assemblages (or ‘situated’ collectivities) that replace the traditional legal
subject can perform spatial justice through the process of withdrawal. I argue that this
material and spatial process, which demands an attunement to materiality and spatiality,
as more than limit or container, introduces a form of ethical practice that can guide legal
and political engagement. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ assemblages engage in this
process of withdrawal because they operate as conative bodies, which are perpetually
striving to sustain themselves, while simultaneously engaging in creative and productive
ontological processes. The crux of Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theory rests in a shift
from thinking through the abstract positionality of a liberal legal subject to the materiality
of a legal body (or assemblage) that reveals the tensions and complex legal (and political)
entanglements that these bodies must negotiate through their positionality. His theoretical
approach allows us to understand how the relationships between human and non-human
agents unfold, and how they may be harnessed to shift the parameters of current
lawscapes in order to give rise to spatial justice. According to PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos, these transformative movements can only occur at the level of the
lawscape (or the material manifestation of laws and regulations), and as such, they
engage both human and non-human legal agents. As legal practice is increasingly coming
to terms with the presence of non-human legal actors (e.g. the environment, animals,
artificial intelligence), the field will have to consider how these actors affect the ways in
which we have traditionally framed legal subjectivity, a relationship which is formed
through very specific understandings of an individual’s relationship to land, for example.
As I considered examples of performing spatial justice, I began to note similarities
between Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ concepts and ethical and political practices
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outlined through theorizations of Indigenous law. In my final chapter I engage in a
comparative analysis of spatial justice and withdrawal with Indigenous legal philosophy
and resurgence. The treatment of the more-than-human in Indigenous theory provides an
example of how ethical practice can be shifted through a more resolute engagement with
spatiality and the nonhuman. Indigenous commitment to a form of social, political and
legal organization based on the idea of a ‘physical’ philosophy that is centered on the
idea of mobility, contradiction, and an attunement to ‘situatedness’, as well as the concept
of ‘all our relations’ which de-centers the human, contribute to this discussion in a
significant way. My knowledge of these theories is derived primarily from the writings of
Anishinaabe legal scholar, John Borrows; however, I believe there is room to expand this
engagement beyond what I have outlined in the thesis, and to consider more carefully
how Indigenous law can play a role in re-framing our understanding of legal subjectivity.
This thesis is structured as a monograph comprised of three chapters. The first chapter
consists of a literature review of the concept of spatial justice which addresses, in
particular, the ways in which different schools of thought have interrogated the political
potential of the concept. By arguing that the question of justice engages the political and
by demonstrating that power relations remain at the core of PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos’ concept of spatial justice, I show that the relationship between justice and
politics persists. The literature review begins with an analysis of the writings of critical
human geographers like David Harvey and Ed Soja, who have played an instrumental
role in introducing and shaping the concept of spatial justice. Then, I discuss the work of
legal geographers, like Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney, Irus Braverman and Mariana
Valverde, whose writing on the mutual constitutivity of law and space has been central to
discussions about the shifting nature of the social and the political in these types of
discourses. I also address legal geography’s engagement with posthumanism, as its most
recent theoretical frontier. Finally, in this first chapter, I unpack some of PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos central concepts (i.e. spatial justice, lawscape, lively agency, continuum,
and atmosphere) in order to demonstrate how it is that he frames the mutual constitutivity
of law and spatiality and how he considers the role of matter in this process.
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The second chapter outlines how assemblages engage in a practice of spatial justice by
delving deeper into Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ framework. By unpacking
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos concepts of lawscape and withdrawal along some of his
main theoretical influences: David Delaney, Doreen Massey, Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari and Karen Barad, I show how we can draw out a political project from his theory
of spatial justice. These individuals help to elucidate the political potential of
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ complex theoretical project; however, I note the influence
of Gilles Deleuze’s writing in The Fold, in particular, as a means of reading withdrawal
as becoming. Deleuze’s writing aids in our understanding of the processes of folding that
sustain the onto-epistemological project of spatial justice, while also maintaining a
creative potential through withdrawal and closure.
As I noted above, the third chapter consists of a comparative analysis between
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ spatial justice and John Borrows’ writing on Indigenous
law and ‘situated’ freedom. According to Borrows, Anishinaabe law is centered on
mobility and agency (as human and more-than-human) which demonstrates an
attunement to positionality that is responsive to the more-than-human. I believe that the
following examples of Indigenous resurgences show what a practice or performance of
spatial justice entails. I draw on two concrete examples of how Indigenous knowledge
plays a central role in resurgent practice, and how it can serve to reorient lawscapes and
open up the possibility of attaining spatial justice: (1) Rebecca Belmore’s performance in
Queen’s Park on Canada Day in 2012; and (2) the blockade on Unist’ot’en and
Wet’suwet’en land that has been in place since 2009.

5

Chapter 1

1

Literature Review of Spatial Justice

1.1 Introduction
This literature review provides an overview of the main theoretical perspectives that have
contributed to the development of a concept of spatial justice. In recent years, critical
scholarship has renewed its interest in the relationship between law and spatiality,
specifically with respect to its influence on legal subjectivity and the practice of social
justice lawyering.1 Although the co-constitutivity of law and space has been a concern for
the emerging, interdisciplinary field of legal geography, critical legal scholars have also
developed a keen interest in the intersection between law and space. One notable figure
of this movement is critical legal scholar, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, whose
recent book, Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere, develops an insightful theory
of the role of space and materiality in relation to law and justice, primarily by adopting a
post-humanist feminist lens. His theory of spatial justice opens up the possibility of
thinking about nonhuman legal agency, and in the process, broadens the scope of the
influence of law in everyday life, and the notion of legal and political resistance.
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has taken a bold, but timely, leap in a field whose
foundation is rooted in a property relation that is decidedly humanist: “the basic notion of
property as the relationship among people in respect of objects.”2 By de-centering the
human legal subject, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos also influences the role of politics in
relation to subjectivity, spatiality and law. He argues that in order to understand this
posthumanist theory of justice the mutual constiutivity of law and space should not be

1

The interdisciplinary field of legal geography has garnered a lot of interest since the publication of
Blomely, Nicholas, David Delaney and Richard T. Ford, editors. Legal Geographies Reader: Law, Power,
and Space. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.
2

Mary Jane Mossman and Phillip Girard, Property Law: Cases and Commentary, 3rd ed. (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery Publications, 2014), 3.
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mediated by a political theoretical lens.3 However, as this literature review will
demonstrate, the concept of spatial justice has been defined by its ‘political’ contribution
to the theorization and practice of law, insofar as it points out spatial manifestations of
power struggles, primarily based on class difference. In order to reflect on the
significance of this concept to legal scholarship, I believe we need to give further
consideration to the relationship between legal subjectivity, justice and space, and
political practice.
This literature review addresses the political dimension of spatial justice and theories of
space in relation to legal subjectivity. I am interested in the persistence of the political,
through a practice of spatial justice, in relation to a legal context in which the human
legal subject is decentered and the influence of nonhuman agency is brought to the
forefront. By centering the question of the ‘political’ in this discussion of spatial justice, I
establish that it is not possible (nor necessary) to relinquish this dimension in order to
craft a posthuman theory of justice.
In order to capture the impact of posthumanism on our current understanding of legal
subjectivity, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos argues, in part, that the co-constitutivity of
law and spatiality is not dependent on human relationality. Although the mutual
constitutivity of law and space is a foundational premise of legal geography scholarship,
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ desire to craft a theory of law and justice that captures the
agency of the nonhuman distinguishes his work from that of more traditional strands of
legal geography. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos argues that space (or matter, in this case)
is also a participant in the process of ontological negotiation in which human bodies
engage, rather than its container, and that it can maintain its own sense of legal (and
political) agency. The mutual constitutivity of law and space gives shape to the borders,
conflicts and movements of these bodies in a much more fundamental sense, and as such,
it gives rise to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos claim that there is no outside to law.4

3

Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere (New York:
Routledge, 2015), 19.
4

Ibid., 1.
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This literature review is organized into three sections. The first two sections will serve as
a theoretical background on spatial justice as a concept that has emerged primarily within
the discipline of geography. The first section will address the critical foundations of the
concept, primarily within the works of David Harvey and Edward Soja. This formulation
of spatial justice is tightly knit to the concept of social justice, demonstrating its Marxist
political roots, as well as the influence of postmodern thought on its early
conceptualizations.
The second section will address the emerging field of legal geography, demonstrating the
concept’s more direct relationship to law, yet maintaining a resolutely political
perspective through the authors’ concerns with the relationship between law and power.
This section will consider the writings of early legal geographers, like Nicholas Blomley
and David Delaney, as well as those of more recent figures, like Irus Braverman. This
trajectory marks a shift in legal geography scholarship from socio-legal relations to
human-nonhuman legal relations. As an emerging interdisciplinary field, legal geography
settles somewhere between geographical and legal thought, though it encounters
difficulty framing the writings of scholars like Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and
Mariana Valverde, who are rethinking the foundations of the relationship between law
and space.5
In the third section, I will discuss the influence of posthumanist thought on the concept of
spatial justice through the work of Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos. At this point, I will
refer to a few of the main concepts that arise in his theory of spatial justice: lawscape,
atmosphere, withdrawal, responsibility of indistinction and lively agencies. In particular,
the last part of this section will discuss the notion of lively agencies as a counterpoint to
legal subjectivity. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theory of justice engages with the blind
spot created by a resolutely humanist perspective, and introduces legal theory to a
philosophical debate on materiality, subjectivity and agency. I contend that this theory of
justice presents us with an alternative ethical framework that is sensitive to the agential

5

David Delaney, “Legal Geography III: New Worlds, New Convergences,” Progress in Human
Geography 41 (2017): 668, doi: 10.1177/0309132516650354.
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capabilities of the nonhuman legal actor, while opening up our thinking on new forms of
political engagement.

1.2 Spatial Justice as Social Justice
1.2.1 David Harvey’s Social Justice
During the 1970s, a desire for a more critical and philosophical engagement with the
concept of space within geographical studies gave rise to the field of critical human
geography.6 The concept of spatial justice was formulated during this time, and it is
primarily associated with the writings of Marxist geographer, David Harvey, whose
seminal work, Social Justice and the City, introduces a theory of social justice premised
on the idea that spatial form and social process inform each other.7
Influenced by the writings of French Marxist thinker Henri Lefebvre, Harvey proposes
“historical-geographical materialism [as] method of inquiry” effectively shifting the
direction of geographical scholarly work towards a more purposeful engagement with
class analysis through spatiality.8 However, as Ed Soja notes, Harvey’s spatial analysis is
primarily focused on social process, rather than the dialectical relationship between the
social and the spatial.9 In order to explain the impact of human practice on social and
political issues, Harvey notes that,
“spatial forms are…seen not as inanimate objects within which the social process
unfolds, but as things which ‘contain’ social processes in the same manner that social
process are spatial.”10

6

Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory
(New York: Verso Books, 1989), 43.
7

Ibid., 51.

8

Ibid., 44 and 52.

9

Ibid., 58.

10

David Harvey, Social Justice and the City: Revised Edition (Athens, Georgia: The University of
Georgia Press, 2009), 10-11.

9

This statement indicates that social processes are produced and reproduced through
particular spatial arrangements, and that the way spaces are framed will influence how
social processes operate.11 However, this particular approach privileges the role of social
process (and human relations) in crafting these spaces without considering the
significance of the relationship between the two.12 The idea that spatial forms act as
‘containers’ for social processes does not provide sufficient insight into the capacity of
space to influence social process (and of course, no insight into the agential capabilities
of the nonhuman), except insofar as it sustains and responds to human action.
This theoretical perspective diverges from Lefebvre’s objective regarding the
“socio-spatial dialectic: that social and spatial relations are dialectically interreactive, interdependent; that social relations of production are both spaceforming and space-contingent (at least insofar as we maintain, to begin with, a
view of organized space as socially constructed).”13
Arguably, this tension strikes at the heart of the literature review because the way in
which the relationship between the spatial and the social is formulated impacts the
definition of subjectivity, which in turn bears implications for the legal and political
dimensions of the discussion. Taking Soja’s concern with Harvey a step further,
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is critical of this cautiously humanist theoretical
engagement with space because it “ignor[es] ecological, technological and other
production processes that eschew the ‘social’ in its narrow, anthropocentric
description.”14 However, I argue that Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ concern with this
narrow definition of the ‘social’ is superimposed on his understanding of the limits of
political engagement, and that while the constitutive relationship between law and space
might provide us with a formulation that is more suited to capture the agential capability
of the non-human, it should not concern itself with the political. However, I am cautious

11

Soja, Postmodern Geographies, 76-77.

12

Ibid., 57.

13

Ibid., 81.

14

Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice, 179.
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of this formulation and propose that politics remains central to this conversation, though
it might not be formulated in a traditional Marxist sense.

1.2.2 Edward W. Soja’s Spatial Justice
Edward Soja is also concerned with the constitutive relationship between the subject and
their spatialized existence, and he wants to return the analysis closer to Lefebvre’s
conceptualization of social and spatial relations. However, his focus on discourse and
representation does not manage to push the question of spatiality as effectively as
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos.
Due to his focus on epistemological analytical frameworks, his spatial analysis remains
firmly positioned within the realm of textuality and representation. This fact is evident in
his early treatment of physical space and matter as a mere empirical concern:
“Space as physical context has generated broad philosophical interest and lengthy
discussions of its absolute and relative properties (a long debate which goes back to
Leibniz and beyond), its characteristics as environmental ‘container’ of human life,
its objectifiable geometry, and its phenomenological essences. But this physical space
has been a misleading epistemological foundation upon which to analyse the concrete
and subjective meaning of human spatiality. Space in itself may be primordially
given, but the organization, and meaning of space is a product of social translation,
transformation, and experience.”15
And, while it may be difficult to discount the value of Soja’s contribution, as well as that
of other geographical thinkers, it limits our ability to engage with space, materiality and
the nonhuman more seriously as long as its focus is resolutely centered on human
sociality. Therefore, Soja’s engagement with the concept of spatial justice is limited by
this understanding of space.
This approach is further solidified in Seeking Spatial Justice: Globalization and
Community, where Soja mediates our understanding of spatial justice through a
politically pragmatic ‘right to occupy or inhabit’.16 While this may be an effective means

15

Soja, Postmodern Geographies, 79-80.

16

Edward W. Soja, Seeking Spatial Justice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 109.
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of mobilizing groups and presenting arguments in favour of inclusion into a liberal
political context, it limits our understanding of the agential capabilities of more-thanhuman actors, and frames spatial justice as a form of social justice sensitive to its spatial
containers.17
Soja defines ‘spatial consciousness’ in this framework as “a way of thinking that
recognize[s] that space is filled with politics and privileges, ideologies and cultural
collisions, utopian ideals and dystopian oppression, justice and injustice, oppressive
power and the possibility of emancipation.”18 Although this approach attunes us to spaces
as the locus of diversity, power struggles and contingency, it represents agents as
“inescapably embedded” in space and geography, collapsing the temporality of these
encounters and relations, and in a sense, ‘freezing’ these individuals in space.19 This
approach establishes a political identity from which the individual can act, since he
claims that the individual maintains the “particularized contingency” of the spaces they
inhabit.20 However, if the particularities of our social context become static and
immutable characteristics of individual experience, then there is little opportunity for a
re-examination of these forms of representation.21As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos notes,
this is merely “a bringing into light of the spaces in which social (in)justice can be
located while conceptualizing itself and the world,” which brings to light one of the main
difficulties with a particular understanding of an identity politics approach, namely using
particular identity positions as universal and fixed markers of individual experience.22

17

Ibid., 109.

18

Ibid., 103.

19

Ibid., 71.

20

Ibid., 68-71.

21

Ibid., 71.

22

Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice, 180.
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However, this debate has been quite pervasive, in particular within feminist political and
legal theory. In Beyond Identity Politics: Feminism, Power, Politics, Moya Lloyd
proposes an alternative conceptualization: the “‘subject-in-process,’ a term [used] to
capture the idea that subjectivity is constituted (by language, discourse, or power),
inessential and thus perpetually open to transformation.”23 Although Lloyd’s theory relies
on discourse and language, it turns away from Soja’s ‘situated’ political agent by
maintaining open the possibility for a readjustment of positionality and tactics in order to
acknowledge “a proliferation of possible sites of political contestation.”24 Lloyd’s work
can be interpreted to claim that materialism and embodiment are considered through a
form of ‘situatedness’ that does not reduce the individual to a category by capturing the
significance of movement and mobility. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s theory of spatial
justice attempts to capture this mobile and shifting subjectivity in the form of
assemblages. Although I will revisit this concept in more detail in the final section, I do
want to note that the operations of these legal assemblages can be indicative of a political
process.

1.2.3 Conclusion
These formulations of spatial justice as social justice pose two problems that may serve to
limit the possibility of justice: (1) spatiality is limited to the operations of social processes
and constraints that result from human practice; and (2) political engagement is premised
on a static identity framed through these constricting spatialities. Then, we can surmise
that in order to understand a more responsive form of political action we need to think of
the spatial and material differently. Legal geographers, who infuse Soja’s perspective on
the role of spatiality within the legal context, have attempted to address the question of
structure or context by arguing for the mutual constitutivity of law and space. The next
part of this literature review will engage with their work, and their understanding of the
concept of spatial justice.

23

Moya Lloyd, Beyond Identity Politics: Feminism, Power and Politics (London: Sage Publications,
2005), 1.
24

Ibid, 2.
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1.3 Law, Politics, and Space: Legal Geography and Spatial
Justice
Legal geography is an interdisciplinary area of study that emerged in the early 1990s, and
is influenced, at least in part, by the writings of critical human geographers. This ‘field’
was developed by individuals interested in the intersection between law, space and power
within the human geography context,25 and as such, it aims to uncover the ways in which
power relations operate through spatio-legal mechanisms. Legal geography is concerned
with the ways in which,
“Distinctively legal forms of meaning are projected onto every segment of the
physical world. These meanings are open to interpretation and may become caught up
in a range of legal practices. Such fragments of a socially segmented world – the
where of law – are not simply the inert sites of law but are inextricably implicated in
how law happens.”26
The engagement with spatiality in this context is reminiscent of that of critical human
geographers insofar as social process is replaced with a socio-legal process which
highlights how the law plays a role in sustaining and framing violence and injustice
through seemingly innocuous every day processes. However, the legal geographers’
approach to the co-constitutions of law and space, especially where it intersects with
theories of performativity, engages with spatiality in a different way.
Although legal geographers do not always employ the term spatial justice explicitly, as
their work is concerned with the convergence of law, space, and power, it does address
the question of justice indirectly. However, David Delaney provides a useful summary of
legal geography’s concern with spatial justice:
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“…because traces of the legal are commonly constitutive of the spatialities of
injustice – underpinning them, shaping relations of power with respect to them,
rendering places meaningful in distinctively legal ways – then much of what legal
geographers do is to investigate the contingencies and constraints of spatial justice…
Legal geographers take us into the workshops where space, law and (in)justice are the
means of the co-production of each other…(In)justice is intrinsically social and
relational in the sense that claims of injustice necessarily call into account inherently
social states of affairs concerning contingent social arrangements – including sociospatial arrangements. ”27
Delaney’s desire to centre the social at the core of this discussion of justice, firmly
positions a humanist perspective at the core of the project as well. An engagement from
this perspective provides insights into how certain socio-legal mechanisms function, but
give us little in the way of guidance beyond their relations of power.
Early investigations into the intersection between law and geography stirred a lively
debate between legal theorists influenced by radical politics and those interested in the
theoretical contributions of post-structuralism. The former argue that the aesthetic
projects of the ‘linguistic turn’ circumvent more practical theoretical initiatives and as a
result hinder social change.28 At its core, the argument turns on the relationship between
representation and materiality in socio-legal debates. This debate reverberates into our
current discussion, as legal geography is a propitious theoretical lens through which to
think about the relationship between the abstract and the concrete dimension of space.
However, Chouinard argues that these fields are more complementary than they seem:
“[l]aw’s space not only threads its way through our daily lives, often in the
‘background’ of our conscience, but it is also a material and conceptual medium
through which people fight for the control and use of space itself.”29
In this example, space as a “tapestry of relations and practices”30 is being represented
both materially and discursively. It unfolds as a narrative of the world that is being
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produced and re-produced through the contributions of those who take part in it, on a
constant basis. As I will later argue, this perspective does not have to exclude the
contributions of the nonhuman in the negotiation of these spaces of law.
Chouinard seems to suggest that materiality forms a bridge between politics and
language, and the epistemological limitations of discourse analyses can be overcome
through a better understanding of the political conditions of those contexts so that
“representations of radicalism [do not] become more important than political praxis.”31
As a reflection on legal geography’s future, Chouinard states,
“A more inclusive radical geography of law and other sites of social conflict also
requires efforts to develop more dynamic conceptions of how and why individual
and collective identities form in specific times and places (Chouinard, 1994), and
how these identities translate into practices which sustain, challenge and
sometimes transform prevailing relations of power in people’s lives, and their
capacities for effective collective action on social issues. These ‘senses of selves’
are not fixed, but evolve as people negotiate material relations of daily life and
assign and reassign (or ‘appropriate’) meaning to their experiences of lived legal
relations and circumstances in specific places.”32

1.3.1 The Co-constitutivity of Law and Space and Performativity
Legal geographers engage in an analysis of spatio-legal relations in order to demonstrate
how particular representations of space shape the subjective position of individuals who
are impacted by the laws or regulations that apply within those spaces. This approach
informs the oftentimes contested presence of the political in law and legal practice. By
uncovering the legal discourses that legitimize violence towards particular groups, and
demonstrating how these are facilitated through specific spaces and sites, legal
geographers have developed a rich and complex field of scholarship which sheds light on
the legal narratives of marginalized groups. In this section, I draw on the work of two
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legal geographers, Nicholas Blomley and David Delaney, to demonstrate legal
geography’s treatment of politics through the co-constitutivity of law and space.
Nicholas Blomely is one of the earliest scholars of the intersection between law and
geography.33 Blomley has written extensively on the property relation and its impact on
marginalized groups, and demonstrated an interest in understanding it as an abstract, but
also material concept.34 According to Blomley, property “is not a static, pre-given entity,
but depends on a continual, active ‘doing,’” which he suggests in a later article “is at once
practical, symbolic and institutional.”35 In order for property relations (and ultimately
power relations) to maintain themselves, bodies and technologies are coopted into the
logic of the space in order to perform the particular dynamics that uphold that space.36
Therefore, the spatial and material dimension of property needs to be re-enacted and
performed in order to be sustained. As Blomley explains,
“Space itself is not only produced through performance, but is simultaneously a
means of disciplining the performances that are possible within it. These social
performances are citational, reiterating past performances and thus reproducing
dominant norms and practices at the same time as they diverge from them.
Similarly, the enactment of property is dependent upon spaces, whether everyday
or imagined, material or discursive. The enactment of property, in turn, helps
constitute those spaces, investing them with particular valences and political
possibilities.”37
This quote captures, more or less, the sentiment of legal geographers with respect to
space, as well as the source of one of Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s main critiques,
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namely that property (or social) relations invest spaces with political possibilities. In this
sense, we note that space is not an active participant, but rather a framework of
reproduction of a specific set of relations, and a tool for discipline. However, by engaging
with these processes through the lens of performativity we are provided with a lens that
permits us to understand the subjects of law as constituted and thus, potentially shifting.
In Nomospheric Investigations: The Spatial, the Legal and the Pragmatics of WorldMaking, David Delaney presents a methodology for legal geography premised on a
performative theory of law by analyzing how it is that we engage space and materiality in
discursive processes. This pivotal text in legal geography is particularly useful here
because it addresses some of the same concerns Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has with
the relationship between law and space as not sufficiently spatial. Before I delve into a
brief explanation of the main concepts introduced by Delaney (i.e. nomoscape,
nomosphere and nomic technicians), I want to note two significant points of convergence
between the works of the two theorists: discursive materiality and performance. I will do
this through the lens of Karen Barad’s posthuman performativity, as it is a concept that
both theorists use in their writing.38
Delany’s writing may not engage with nonhuman legal actors, but it does engage with
objects that act as ‘technologies of delimitation’, like walls, barriers, turnstiles, etc.
Delaney employs the concept of discursive materiality to create the concept of
nomicity.39 Like Barad, he invokes performative practice to bridge discourse and our
material surroundings and explain how we engage in processes of ‘world-making’.40
Delaney’s project focuses on the production of knowledge in spaces that are dominated
by particular laws and particular power relations. However, given Barad’s theoretical
focus, her project aligns itself closer to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ because it claims
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an agential capability of the nonhuman that is not a concern for Delaney in quite the same
way. Yet, this point of convergence between Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and
Delaney’s theoretical perspectives remains a useful point of interrogation.
Due to the fact that the engagement with materiality that emerges in Delaney’s work is
primarily one that casts matter as a tool or technology,41 for matter to matter then, it must
provide some use to human actors. In Delaney’s investigation these forms of materiality
play a role in upholding, and perhaps, recreating asymmetrical power relations.
Therefore, the human sits at the center of this analysis, and we can clearly see how any
engagement with spatiality must uphold a social context. This shapes the concepts I will
summarize below, and thus solidifies the scope of legal geography as an investigation
into the mutual constitutivity of law and space, where space is to be understood as
something produced by humans for human use.
The ‘nomosphere’ is a driving concept behind Delaney’s work. He defines it as,
“the cultural-material environs that are constituted by the reciprocal materialization
of ‘the legal,’ and the legal signification of the ‘socio-spatial,’ and the practical,
performative engagement through which such constitutive moments happen and
unfold.”42
The nomosphere is the product of two concepts, the Greek word ‘nomos’ which is used to
describe law or custom, and the biosphere, which suggests an enclosed environment in
which particular investigations can be conducted.43 As a combination of these two
notions, then, the nomosphere presents a cross-cut of social, political and legal activity
that lends itself to analysis so that we may draw greater conclusions about how particular
mechanisms function. However, an analysis of the ‘nomosphere’ might be difficult to
conduct since we are generally participants in it.44 Our movements, choices, practice all
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contribute to the sustaining of the ‘nomosphere’, and perhaps they can also contribute to
its undoing. This premise is also shared by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos: assemblaging
bodies have the capability to shift the course of the larger mechanisms of the lawscape
and atmosphere.
According to Delaney, the ‘nomosphere’ is a useful concept because it “successfully
holds together the socio-spatial and the socio-legal while foregrounding the dynamic
interplay of forms of social meaning and materiality; as these are implicated in the
historical constitution of socio-relational power and situated, embodied experience.”45
This concept sums up the main goals of Delaney’s theory, and it demonstrates that
although there is an engagement with ‘spatialized’ concepts and physical materiality, the
main point of the concept (and perhaps legal geography more broadly) is to engage with
representation and identity (or subjective positioning) at the expense of the spatial. This
project is significant in so far as it is important to identify and uncover forms of
inequality and injustice within the social realm, however, it only shows one aspect of the
potential engagement with spatiality. Furthermore, as I will argue throughout the thesis,
an engagement with the non-human in a more purposeful way can open the possibility to
new ethical positions, and thus, a more robust form of spatial justice, for human and
nonhuman agents alike. The first step forward is a deeper understanding of the coconstiutivity of law and space.

1.3.2 New Directions in Legal Geography
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulo is not alone in trying to incorporate the nonhuman or novel
perspectives on the relationship between space, time and law. In this section, I discuss the
work of Irus Braverman, Mariana Valverde and Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos,
their perspective on space and materiality, and the role of politics in their analysis,
especially in relation to nonhuman legal actors.
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In a recent publication, David Delaney identifies a growing anxiety surrounding the
parameters and the definition of the field of legal geography, and he confirms that legal
geography should pay closer attention to “the world of other places beyond Western
common law legal regimes; the world of the international; and the physical, other-thanhuman worlds.”46 However, there is no indication in his summary as to how the
methodology of legal geography will change to accommodate these new areas of inquiry,
or even what challenges these fields might pose from a fundamental theoretical
standpoint.
Irus Braverman, who is interested in engaging with the nonhuman in a legal setting,
identifies two main ideas that need to be further considered (or perhaps returned to) in
discussions about legal geography: power and time.47 Her solution to the challenges
posed by the presence of nonhuman actors in legal contexts is a renewed interest in
pragmatism, and specifically, the benefits posed by an analysis that focuses on the idea of
‘power with others’ rather than ‘power over others’.48 Braverman herself notes that there
is an impact on how space can be thought:
“Space figures [in relation to the nonhuman] in terms of traditional conceptions of
place, landscape, and scale, for example, than as a way of approaching alterity,
diversity, and multiplicity.”49
Since the publication of The Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography in
2014, there has been an increased interest in the question of treatment of nonhuman or
more-than-human actors within legal contexts.50 However, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos
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is among the few legal scholars who have attempted to grapple with the theoretical and
philosophical foundations of the relationship more purposefully.
Mariana Valverde is another significant contributor to a discussion of the theoretical
engagement with law and space although she approaches this question from the
perspective of time in relation to the analysis of law and spatiality. In Chronotopes of
Law: Jurisdiction, Scale, Governance, Valverde introduces the concept of a ‘legal
chronotope’, which allows
“us to explore how different legal times create or shape legal spaces, and vice
versa: how the spatial location and spatial dynamics of legal processes in turn
shape law’s times – how spatial dynamics thicken time.”51
Valverde argues that it is important to consider “how temporalization affects
spatialization and vice versa [as well as] how heterogeneous and even contradictory
chronotopes coexist not only in a single literary (or legal) text but even within a single
utterance.”52 The ‘chronotope’ takes many shapes: for example, as a legal setting, as a
complex legal process, or as a figure that is caught in this process. It is merely used to
describe the particular characteristics analyzed in space and time that might arise when a
particular legal issue arises. For example, criminalizing marital rape assumes that the
spouse is an autonomous person who engages in a transaction, and thus, is required to
consent to taking part in that process.53 This particular example demonstrates how the
chronotope of the family is impacted by the chronotope of the market (through the liberal
subject). For Valverde, the productive moment of analysis occurs at the point of
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interaction between space and time.54 The significant contribution of the legal chronotope
is its emphasis on legal processes and systems rather than individual action. While
individual ‘tactical decisions’ might drive the change in the legal process, the focus is on
the operations of the system as a whole, rather than the intentionality or agency of the
individual.55 This perspective is echoed in the discussion of spatial justice and the role of
political agency, which will be discussed in more detail in the second part of this
literature review.

1.4

Spatial Justice and Posthumanism

The influence of posthumanist thought on the relationship between law and space rests at
the core of this next stage in the development of the concept of spatial justice.
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, arguably, has crafted a posthumanist theory of justice
through his work in Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere, however he is not
alone in attempting to think through the relationship between posthumanism and social
justice.56 In this section, I will introduce a main influence on PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos’ thought, Karen Barad’s theory of a posthuman performativity, and then I
will move into a description of some of the more salient concepts that are put forward in
Spatial Justice, specifically in relation to law and spatiality.
In her seminal article, “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How
Matter Comes to Matter,” Karen Barad argues for a shift from
“questions of correspondence between descriptions and reality (e.g., do they
mirror nature or culture?) to matters of practices/doings/actions [because they]
bring to the forefront important questions of ontology, materiality, and agency,
while social constructivist approaches get caught up in the geometrical optics of
reflection where, much like the infinite play of images between two facing
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mirrors, the epistemological gets bounced back and forth, but nothing more is
seen.”57
Barad builds on the writings of critical social and political theorists, like Michel Foucault
and Judith Butler to consider “how the body’s materiality – for example, its anatomy and
physiology – and other material forces actively matter to the processes of
materialization.”58 She is concerned with the ways in which power operates through
materiality, taking into consideration matter’s agential capability in this process, and,
raising an argument for a more purposeful engagement with the materiality of discursive
analysis.59 Drawing on the performative nature of discourse, Barad argues that
“Matter, like meaning, is not an individually articulated or static entity. Matter is
not little bits of nature, or a blank slate, surface, or site passively awaiting
signification; nor is it an uncontested ground for scientific, feminist, or Marxist
theories. Matter is not a support, location, referent, or source of sustainability for
discourse. Matter is not immutable or passive. It does not require the mark of an
external force like culture or history to complete it. Matter is always already an
ongoing historicity.”60
Barad presents us with an analysis of material agency beyond social spatiality. Against
Delaney’s interpretation of Barad’s work, then, the material engagements and spatial
frameworks may be attributed to a material-discursive analysis in accordance with
Foucault or Butler’s ‘social constructivist’ perspectives, but it need not stop there.61
However, by shifting the discussion away from the social, have we also shifted the
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discussion away from the political? What implications does this hold for spatial justice as
social justice?
As I noted in the earlier sections, the idea of spatial justice was introduced as a
way to theorize social injustice and inequality in a capitalist system, and more
specifically, in an urban setting. It served a dual purpose by exposing the ways in which
social and economic inequality affected marginalized communities, and by providing the
language and framework through which activist work could be spatially situated.
Therefore, from its incipient stages, spatial justice was a politically-oriented legal
concept. Legal geography continued the analysis of law and space through a social justice
lens. However, these approaches are both theoretically (and ultimately practically)
ineffective because they do not address the constitutive premises of legal relationships
from a materialist perspective. Rather, as a reflection of social injustice, the concept only
serves to uncover an alternative perspective of a legal context, but it is often unsuccessful
in dismantling the system that gave rise to those oppositions. Following Barad and
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, I argue that a more purposeful engagement with
materiality and the nonhuman can provide insight into addressing the shortcomings of
social justice analyses.

1.4.1 What is (Posthuman) Spatial Justice?
Spatial justice is produced through a rupture at the level of the lawscape. The
lawscape is defined by movement and embodiment. It is both material and discursive,
and unlike the atmosphere, it is mutable. The lawscape is made up of the physical,
material world and the bodies that move within it, the rules and regulations that shape
them, and anything in-between, including affect, emotion, unknown materials, etc. A
fixed or situated representation of the lawscape results in an atmosphere, thick with
discourse, yet sufficiently diffuse to envelop large systems and assemblages. A key
characteristic of atmosphere is its ability to dissimulate the mechanisms through which it
functions.62
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The lawscape is the site where conflicts and displacements unfold, and a rupture
or reorientation of the lawscape can produce a possibility of spatial justice. However, the
rupture that opens up the possibility for spatial justice must reverberate through multiple
lawscapes and eventually through the atmosphere in order for change (reorientation) to
result in spatial justice.63 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos explains that spatial justice
occurs when the ruptured lawscape engages in a lawscaping process that hinges on
repetition and disruption of other lawscapes.64 Lawscapes can turn into atmospheres and
vice versa.65 There is a constant motion at play here which captures the movement of
bodies, and the tilting of the continuum.66
As mentioned earlier, spatial justice distances itself from the ‘distributive’ nature
of the idea of social justice in order to frame a more fluid understanding of the legal
subject. Or precisely because there is ‘no outside to law,’ by thinking through spatial
justice we are able to understand how legal assemblages and bodies are more effective
means of capturing our relationship to our legal surroundings that the legal subjective
lens. The impact of spatial justice is palpable and shattering, as it leads to a reframing of
the lawscape within which bodies (or assemblages) operate.
However, I believe that Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos encounters difficulty
framing the political dimension of spatial justice because it cannot be conceptualized as
will flowing from a legal subject. In line with legal geographical thinking, his analysis
demonstrates a vested interest in revealing the mutually constitutive relationship between
law and spatiality, however, this is achieved at the expense of ‘politics’ because politics
has been framed with the human subject at its core. He explains as follows,
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“The problem with the above analyses – and in full awareness of an arguably
unjust generalization – is that the spatial remains an adjectival context, a
background against which considerations of the surrounding space are thrown into
relief with the ‘obscured spatiality of all aspects of social life.’ Society is
reinstated in its primacy, the human subject never abandons his enlightened
central perspective, and the usual rationalizing political processes are applied
even if presented in their revolutionary variation…”67
Legal geographers have carefully analyzed specific legal relationships in order to show
how it is that spatial dynamics play a role in maintaining particular power relations, and
shaping these legal subjects. The political dimensions of these legal subjective positions
are much more evident because the positionality is fairly uncontested once identified.
What I mean to say is that although we are made aware of the conflicts and power
relations that may arise in particular legal contexts, we are not asked to challenge the
framing of legal subjectivity outright, we are merely presented with its opposite, or its
‘other’. One of the reasons for this kind of approach is based on the fact that legal
geographers’ projects align themselves closer to social justice discourse and legal
practice, and a particularly humanist perspective. Again, this approach aspires to be
inclusionary by extending the same types of rights to others, without contesting the
grounding or definition of those rights, and oftentimes, their necessary reliance on that
exclusivity. The potential for a more radical understanding of the issues at the heart of
these spatial dynamics is lost if we do not push the limits of the legal subject. This
proposition in turn demands a novel investigation of the role of materiality and the
political in our understanding of spatial justice. By framing legal subjectivity through the
lens of spatial justice and legal assemblages, we are able to grasp a new ethical position
which may have lasting implications for human rights discourses. This ethical position is
borrowed from posthumanist theory, and it is described as the ‘responsibility of
indistinction’; it is informed by Karen Barad’s concept of ‘agential separability’. I will
introduce this concept properly in the section on agency and political practice.
Spatial justice does not necessarily guarantee a solution to the various problems
that arise in law (or the societies it frames). It poses a problem or a question, and
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contributes to a constant analysis of the current structures that define our existence, in
hopes that it can reorient the discussion, and shift some fundamental aspect of our legal
(and arguably social and political organization). As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos
explains,
“At the same time however, the concept is aware of its limitations.
Epistemologically, it can never do away with the incommunicability between
epistemes. Ontologically, and in the same vein, it can never be the solution.
Spatial justice cannot bring about better identities, more organized popular will,
broader consensus, healthier or richer developing countries. Nor can it do away
with time and its fundamental role in conceptualisations of justice. In fact, it
specifically does not attempt to do the latter. Instead, it simply posits a shift of
emphasis, and a temporary one at that. The best it can hope to do is delineate the
problem, initiate a discussion on the conditions, acknowledge the hitherto
marginalized spatial factor: in short, while acknowledging and working through
the impossibility of a solution, spatial justice brings forth the conditions of such
and impossibility, thereby allowing a flicker of possibility to stream through.”68
Although movement lawyers, or per Delaney, nomospheric technicians, would have a
tough time accepting this idea of justice, they would also be able to recognize uncertainty
as a fundamental aspect of their everyday work. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is
describing an inherently political problem when he talks about the ‘incommunicability
between epistemes’. Politics cannot be reduced only to identities and conflict between
them, but rather the negotiation of those spaces of everyday life, and the materialdiscursive processes that give rise to these identities. In fact, PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos clarifies his intention as follows,
“This is the challenge of spatial justice: to negotiate a contested space without
taking recourse to origins, central commands, outlines. To be thrown into the
mobile multiplicity of the grass is to follow the blades waving in the wind: spatial
justice is required to understand bodies as posthuman assemblages, that is with
their political, personal, legal, religious, technological elements, moving on a
continuum of differentiated power relations.”69
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Although we are presented with a different political process, we are presented with a
political process nonetheless, and it is important to investigate how we can consider a
performance, or practice, of spatial justice.

1.4.2 Rupturing the Continuum: The Politics of Spatial Justice
In order to think about the political implications of spatial justice, we have to
address the shift in thinking in terms of legal subjectivity and political agency to thinking
about assemblages and lively agency. By eschewing the idea of the legal subject, and
replacing it with the notion of assemblage or situated collectivity, we are able to think
more dynamically about the implications of our bodies in relation to other bodies (human
or nonhuman). This perspective allows us to understand how nonhuman entities are
actively implicated in our social and political existence. This approach does not intend to
imbue material space with vitality or to anthropomorphize objects; rather, it aims to
demonstrate that these bodies maintain and contribute to a political framework.
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos invokes the assemblage as a framework through which we
can understand interactions between different participants on a continuum in order to
allow us to see the networked and complex interactivity between bodies on that
continuum.
By removing politics from the discussion, he is not suggesting that the possibility
of a type of politics is not present in the interactions between human and nonhuman
bodies, rather, he is suggesting that the notion of political agency has changed because
the individual is not exercising political will in a traditional subjective sense. For this
reason, he approaches this discussion through the lens of agency. It is understandable that
this position will seem strange, in particular to legal geographers, who are attempting to
work new subjective categories (animals, environment, artificial intelligence, microbes,
trees, etc) into an already-established framework of rights discourses. However, thinking
about political agency beyond the human, or restricted categories that are formulated in
relation to the human, complicates the situation when we want to invoke the idea of
social justice in relation to spatiality and materiality.
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Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is attempting something quite brave for legal
theory, which is to help us grasp our fundamental vulnerability in the world, and to give
us an opportunity to think that position in a legal context. He has to do this by taking the
human-centred legal subject off its pedestal, and propose a novel approach to its reconstruction. This approach becomes increasingly interesting in light of the introduction
of new tech to facilitate governance and essentially alter the basis of human interaction.

1.4.3 Lively Agencies and the Assemblage
Lively agency is a form of agential capability that is not centered on the human (or
the nonhuman); it does not attempt to reformulate hierarchies between animate and
inanimate bodies, but rather, according to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, it addresses the
single, defining characteristic of all bodies, which is their singularity (i.e. a conative
withdrawal).70
Lively agency is informed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s theories on bodies
and assemblages, Graham Harman’s notion of ontological withdrawal, and to a more
limited extent Michel Foucault’s biopolitics. Lively agency is defined as “the ability of
bodies (animate and inanimate) to withdraw in their singularity while connecting to other
bodies.”71 This form of agency can only emerge within the space of the law because it
acts as the “vessel through which the law emerges, since each body is responsible for its
position in relation to the wider assemblage.”72
The assemblages shifting and moving through the lawscape provide the flexibility
and adaptability necessary to recognize the pressure of particular power relations. This
kind of approach differs from that of legal geographers because it is not reliant on the
dialectical oppressor/oppressed binary and the spatial context that sustains the legal
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violence which gives rise to this relationship. However, this does not mean that resistance
and agency are not present in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s work. In fact, I believe his
theory presents a more politically relevant relationship because it relies on encounter, and
negotiation, rather than origin and causality.73 However, in that process it does not
attempt to obscure the reality of power relations, nor the fact that some bodies have a
greater ability to influence the movement and direction of the assemblage.74
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos also draws our attention to the failure of these
processes to be perpetually open towards their vulnerability to cooptation. He notes the
following with respect to assemblages and the potential of rhizomatic thinking,
“[h]owever, rhizomes have been routinely fetishized in the literature as the way to
guarantee openness, flexibility, flatness and contingency. But rhizomes are also
co-opted, overcoded and used in ways that go against the very idea of rhizome.
Received legal histories, prefabricated political positions, historical origins and
facts that have been maintained as affects of spatial and temporal nostalgia or
claims for reterritorialization make use of rhizomes and their affective way of
spreading. We are all encased in atmospherics of legal and political engineering
which spread imitatively, rhizomatically. The space in the middle is not always
open and possible. It often succumbs to the rhizomatics of atmospheres. This is
the struggle: the middle is neither necessarily ‘good’ nor ‘bad’, positive or
negative. In its point of folding, the tilting surface gathers speed, becomes
vertiginous, with bodies sucked in or centripetally deracinated. It is not an easy
space to be in, and no readily available moral hook is there to orient us.”75
The capabilities of the assemblage demonstrate that these spaces are vulnerable to
cooptation, which in a sense, acknowledges the uncertainty of politics, even though there
is a risk of harmful outcomes.

1.4.4 Lively Agencies and the Responsibility of Indistinction
Lively agency is not agential in the sense that it initiates action, but rather because it
opens itself up to the possibility of being “acted upon” by ‘a life’ (i.e. a virtual and not
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yet actualized form of agency).76 This ability is made possible through the assemblage
because it fosters both actualized and virtual bodies through its perpetual moving and
shifting borders. This ability also permits a different understanding of responsibility: a
responsibility of indistinction.
However, there is no guarantee of openness, rather the ‘ability to be acted upon’ is
premised on the notion that all bodies tend towards a conative withdrawal. And, because
these shifts are taking place within assemblage formations, then those bodies are
displacing other bodies as they retract. They are also responding to their conative desire,
but they are also producing something through that relation.77 They actualize, but never
reveal themselves as full objects.
The continuum, “a tilted, power-structured surface, on which bodies move, rest and
position themselves, affecting the tilt while being affected by it,”78 is differentiated
through ruptures that arise out of a process of folding. The continuum folds into itself
(through the process of withdrawal), and as such creates temporary distinctions. The
bodies that move on this continuum are assemblages, premised on relations and entering
in relations with other bodies/assemblages. Although these assemblages are inherently
amoral, the bodies within have a choice with respect to how they position themselves in
relation to other bodies.79 The tilt on the continuum is achieved because of the ‘weight’
or ‘power’ of an assemblage (human or nonhuman).80 He states,
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“one can organize one’s own body (itself an assemblage, namely a collectivity) in
relation to the rest of the assemblage, in its turn in relation to the world. Each
assemblage is a lawscape, and the lawscape keeps moving.”81
He names this process withdrawal, or the responsibility of indistinction. It is achieved
because of our inherently entangled collectivity, and the fact that we bear a degree of
responsibility towards each other as a result of this entanglement.82 This situated
responsibility captures the fine line between understanding that we may not have
complete control over the movement of certain assemblages (especially very powerful
ones, like large corporations or natural disasters), and that we are not absolved of
responsibility simply because we might not have control over these greater structures. 83

1.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this literature review was to demonstrate that spatial justice is not
an apolitical project, but rather that it attempts to frame an alternative view of politics in
order to distance itself from its humanist roots. Through spatial justice we are presented
with a material, embedded and contingent form of legal and political existence. A
continuum brims with activity because of the political nature of the assemblages that are
constantly moving and shifting as a result of the power relations that unfold within.
However, those power relations are not necessarily hinged on human-human relations,
but through a mutual conative desire to persist, these struggles can emerge between all
kinds of bodies. Therefore, the mutual co-constitutivity of law and space maintains a
political dimension at its core.
The next chapter will present a more pointed argument for the political dimension
of spatial justice and argue for a performative practice of spatial justice, in order to
provide an indication of what political activism and social justice lawyering may look
like.
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Chapter 2

2

Performative Assemblages and Spatial Justice

2.1 Introduction
In the following chapter I argue that politics remains a central aspect of the concept of
spatial justice, and that the mutual constitutivity of law and space relies on a
performativity, albeit a posthuman one. In order for the lawscape to be reoriented, and
open up the possibility of spatial justice, the assemblaging bodies of the lawscape engage
in a performance of spatial justice.
The mutual constitutivity of law and spatiality reflects the significance of law in everyday
life in a manner that acknowledges it as a simultaneously abstract and material concept.
This approach to legal theory is important not only because it uncovers the pervasive
presence (and violence) of the law, but also because it reveals the complicated nature of
the distinction between the legal and the political in conventional legal practice. For
example, the fact that we categorize lawyers who advocate for social justice as ‘political
lawyers’ speaks to this deeply problematic representation of law and politics, and the
need to delimit the legal and the political then becomes a tool for rendering power
relations invisible.
According to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, spatial justice emerges through a rupture (or
reorientation) of the lawscape which is produced by the spatial negotiations of the
assemblages that move across the surface of the continuum that sustains the lawscape.
Although these bodies may have particular tendencies based on their placement within
the lawscape, they are responsive to the collective nature of the assemblages with which
they engage. This responsiveness speaks to bodies’ ability to shift and change depending
on the situation, which can be beneficial or detrimental to the greater assemblage.
By acknowledging the double articulation between law and space, we also begin to see
how the field can be influenced from the outside in a much more effective and coherent
way. Although Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos claims that there is no outside to law, that is
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merely a commentary on the fact that law is everywhere; however, this does not mean
that politics is no longer a necessary constitutive aspect of how law and space co-emerge.
Therefore, the relationship between interior/exterior (or closure and openness) becomes a
central concern to this theory. I argue that in order to understand the political implications
of spatial justice we need to engage with Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’
conceptualization of the outside.
Unlike the legal geographers, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos frames the co-constitutivity
of law and space as a concept that blurs disciplinary boundaries, allowing us to
understand how seemingly non-legal actions can bear deep legal implications. I want to
use this opportunity to suggest that, in this sense, spatial justice provides an opportunity
to think about how political issues can shift legal discourses in very effective ways by
actively engaging with their environments in different ways. Simultaneously, it suggests
that shifts in our environments, whether prompted through human or nonhuman action,
could have lasting implications on our legal and political landscape.
In order to establish this position, I read Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ complex
theoretical perspective closer to the texts that inform it, specifically those of Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, despite the fact that he distances himself from these theories.
The influence of these two French thinkers is present through the use of concepts like the
fold, reorientation, rupture and immanence. I argue that a Deleuzo-Guattarian political
ontology is present in the concept of spatial justice, and that it emerges through the idea
of the co-constitutivity of law and space in the lawscape. I will propose that performing
spatial justice depends on the political activity of assemblages comprised of both human
and nonhuman agents.
This chapter is divided into three sections which are centered on PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos’ main concepts: (1) The Lawscape: A Mutual Constitutivity of Law and
Space; (2) Withdrawal: Monadic Bodies, Assemblages, and Lively Agencies; and (3)
Performing Spatial Justice: Assemblages and the Reorientation of the Lawscape.
Although I will address the influence of Deleuze and Guattari’s writing throughout, the
main analysis of their writing will take place in the two sections. The second section will
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investigate the posthuman legal subjectivity and agency envisioned by PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos, and its political implications. Finally, the third section will introduce what
I believe to be the practice of spatial justice, namely how bodies perform spatial justice,
and it will argue for the need to recognize political thought and agency alongside the law.

2.2 The Lawscape: The Mutual Constitutivity of Law and
Space
As I mentioned in the first chapter, the mutual constitutivity of law and space is a concept
which emerged, at least within contemporary theoretical discourse, in the writings of
legal geographers in the 1980s and 1990s. This relationship between law and space can
provide insight into how it is that we can begin to re-conceptualize legal subjectivity and
agential capability. Yet, in order to engage with this project from a legal and
philosophical perspective, and to be able to consider the agential capabilities of the nonhuman, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos distances himself from the social and political
space of the legal geographers, eventually arguing that law “kills politics.”84

2.2.1 David Delaney on the Mutual Constitutivity of Law and Space
The mutual constitutivity of law and space is defined by legal geographers as the way in
which law influences social space, and in turn, how social spaces affect the laws that are
required to contain and define these spaces.85 David Delaney presents the close link
between these two seemingly disparate disciplines as a practice of “world-making.”86 The
objective of these projects is to investigate the ways in which a trans-disciplinary analysis
can serve to uncover new meanings and practices within these legal spaces and
specifically with respect to the bodies that enact them.87
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Influenced by Henri Lefebvre’s work on the production of space, legal geographers view
law as productive of social space and vice versa. However, the significance of Lefebvre’s
work rests in how it is that he sets up the “socio-spatial dialectic,” and the way that space
is viewed as a more significant actor.88 Arguably, this engagement sets his work apart,
even from legal geographers. In his seminal work, Production of Space, Lefebvre applies
a Marxist analysis to demonstrate how cities are shaped by the social relations of those
who inhabit them, and how these in turn solidify and reproduce these relationships. To
Lefebvre these processes are mutually productive, and the notion of social space and the
performance of social space in a capitalist system stems from his thinking.
However, due to a focus on the social and political significance of this analysis, legal
geographers seek a better sense of how space and matter could be represented through
these processes. In an effort to bridge this gap, Delaney proposes the concept of
‘nomoscape’ which he describes as follows:
“Nomoscapes may most intuitively be thought of as nomic landscapes. But…these
are not simply occupied (as we might imagine figures in a landscape), they are lived.
They are continually enacted through engaged, situated human activity. The practical
organization of nomoscapes strongly conditions how people move through their
worlds. They determine what lines we encounter, cross, or refrain from crossing;
what consequences follow from our crossings; how we are differentially positioned
and repositioned with respect to nomic fields of power.”89
Therefore, the nomoscape is a landscape formed of different interrelated or overlapping
settings, each with its own specific characteristics and power dynamics which are
sustained through law and space.90 Delaney informs us early on that these spaces are
performed, and the legal subjects who move within (or perhaps, through) these spaces,
are produced by these spaces, as they in turn produce these spaces. This perspective on
law and spatiality is informed by a variety of theoretical sources, but Karen Barad theory
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of posthuman performativitiy influences Delaney’s analysis, and in a sense, brings him
closer to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ work.
This theoretical framework becomes instrumental in understanding how spaces are
employed to produce and advance legal forms of violence and inequality. Legal
geographers then attempt to uncover, articulate and analyze the relationship between law
and space from this perspective. However, this analysis operates largely at the level of the
epistemological and representational. The legal subjects who are enacted through the
performative processes of these legal spaces seem to become trapped within the logic of
these spaces and the oppressor/oppressed binary. Therefore, while the legal geographers
allow us to understand the operations of power through the production of these legal
spaces, they are not able to capture the fullness of the performative subjects that inhabit
the nomoscape beyond their identity in relation to that space, or the dynamic between
themselves, and usually, the state as an oppressive mechanism. This point is further
evidenced in the fact that, ultimately, the site of agential privilege is held by Delaney’s
nomospheric technicians, or ‘political’ lawyers, as they operate at the border between
oppressors and oppressed to resolve conflicts.

2.2.2 Doreen Massey on Political Space
A main challenge for thinkers of space has been the collapsing of the spatial and
material into the textual.91 Doreen Massey developed a theory of spatiality, drawing in
part on a Deleuzo-Guattarian becoming, that challenges conventional understandings of
the ‘production of space’ because they undergo the risk of rendering space as static and
measurable, or representational.92 Instead, she proposes an understanding of space as
activity:
“For if scientific/intellectual activity is indeed to be understood as an active and
productive engagement in/of the world it is none the less a particular kind of practice,
a specific form of engagement/production in which it is hard to deny (to absolve
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ourselves from the responsibility for?) any element of representation (see also Latour,
1999b; Stengers, 1997), even if it is, quite certainly, productive and experimental
rather than simply mimetic, and an embodied knowledge rather than a mediation. It
does not however have to be conceived of as producing a space, nor its characteristics
carried over to inflect our implicit imaginations of space. For to do so is to rob place
of those characteristics of freedom (Bergson), dislocation (Laclau) and surprise (de
Certeau) which are essential to open it up to the political.”93
While the idea of the performativity of space might seem to bring Doreen Massey in line
with the work of the legal geographers, she argues against thinking a multiplicity of
perspectives that open up space to plurality in the sense of categories, but rather, for a
view of a multiplicity which keeps alive the possibility of new trajectories for those who
engage in these spatial processes. She urges us to adopt a theory of spatiality that
recognizes becoming as the necessary condition of life, and that becoming is always
with.94
She uses the concept of throwntogetherness to capture these spatio-temporal
processes:
“but what is special about place is not some romance of a pre-given collective
identity or of the eternity of the hills. Rather, what is special about place is
precisely that throwntogetherness, the unavoidable challenge of negotiating a
here-and-now (itself drawing on a history and a geography of thens and theres);
and a negotiation which must take place within and between both human and
nonhuman…This is the event of place.”95
Therefore, Massey sets us up for a thinking of space as open, processual and grounded in
the negotiations of bodies, all with the desire to keep open the possibility of thinking the
political.
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2.2.3 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos on the Lawscape
In “And for Law: Why Space Cannot be Understood Without Law” PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos mounts a critique of Massey’s work based primarily on the idea that her
writing fails to capture the inherent relationship between law and space.96 The main
critique rests in the fact that law is understood only as positivist, doctrinal, and inflexible,
which are the main critiques Massey (and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos) apply to
conventional theorizations of space.97 However, there is a fundamental distinction in how
they theorize law and space out of their representational prisons, namely that Massey
turns to a positivity inherent in space, and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos finds himself
having to capture the negativity of law.98 I argue that in order to think through the
potential of the mutual constitutivity of law and space we need to address this tension
between Massey’s open and affirmative politics and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’
closed and auto-poietic law because it impacts the role of politics at the heart of an
analysis of law and space.
In framing this tension, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos re-affirms a very particular, yet
conventional, relationship between politics and law:
“Law operates through rupture and exclusion as a matter of course. One of the things
that law ruptures and fragments is reality. The various narratives of the people who
come to or are called by the law, are submitted to a process of legal analysis and
indeed fragmentation, excluding irrelevant facts and retaining only the ones that can
be converted into legally ingestible bites. For this reason, law habitually excludes
politics. This initially might appear counter-intuitive, but it is important to understand
that law is not politics…but the idea of exclusion of politics from law is an integral
part of the legal identity. In a universally and equitably applied law, political biases
are just that and must be avoided if the desired impression of neutrality and
objectivity of the law is to remain beyond approach…Law must remain apolitical if it
is to retain (the allure of) objectivity.”99
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In response to this statement, I argue that the process through which law excludes politics
is in and of itself political, and furthermore, it is by understanding the materiality of the
mutual constitutivity of law and space that we are made aware of this fact. Material and
spatial practice reveals the implications and negotiations that stem from the ‘universal’
and abstract application of the law. Therefore, on one hand, politics cannot be cast into
the shadows of legal practice, and on the other hand, politics cannot be reduced to a
rudimentary understanding of identity politics and representation, or ‘political bias’. The
significance of understanding the relationship between law and space through a
performative lens is that it recognizes flexible and shifting identity positions of the bodies
that are affected by it through an engagement with materiality. Therefore, in order to
recognize the limitations of the law, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos accepts the basic
operational nature of law as a tendency towards closure.

2.2.4 Lawscape, Body, and Political Agency
The mutual constitutivity of law and space is marked by the concept of the lawscape in
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theoretical universe. The lawscape is the outcome of the
co-emergence of law and space, and it is formed through the interactions between the
material world, the environment and the bodies (assemblages) that move across its
continuum. The lawscape is vibrant and continuous, while also perpetually ruptured, and
vulnerable to reorientation. This fact is meant to reflect the dynamic nature of the
lawscape, and to distinguish it from the engineered atmospheres that operate through
diffuse and yet suffocating and constrictive laws.100 The lawscape is ontologically
negative and reliant on closure, however, because it is material and produced through the
folding and unfolding of the continuum (space), “it accepts negativity within a much
ampler, positive plenitude.”101
This seemingly fraught dynamic between openness and closure plays a significant role in
shaping the ontological premises of the bodies and assemblages that emerge within these
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lines, and thus, is significant to an understanding of agency and subjectivity within this
legal framework. In the following section, I will address how PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos understands the body and its agential capabilities. This will bring us one
step closer to thinking about the performance of spatial justice.

2.3 Withdrawal, Monadic Bodies and Assemblages
The theoretical thought of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari has a significant influence
on the concepts of spatial justice and the lawscape. Concepts like folding, immanence
and reorientation, which are oftentimes used in framing this theoretical perspective on
law and justice, are drawn from the writings of these two French philosophers, as well as
the political ontology that they crafted through their collaborations. Although
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has explicitly stated that his theories are not exclusively
Deleuzo-Guattarian, I believe that there are sufficient theoretical overlap to allow us to
craft a theory of political agency within spatial justice and the lawscape by taking a closer
look at this relationship.102
As I noted in the earlier section, a noteworthy distinguishing factor between
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ writing and that of Deleuze and Guattari revolves around
the question of closure, and the desire to understand the negativity of the law without
capitulating to the openness that is typically attributed to the writings of Deleuze and
Guattari. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos wants to develop a theory of law and justice that
is capable of explaining this fundamental characteristic of law, while at the same time,
working towards recognizing the embeddedness and contingency of legal practice. I
argue that if we want to think of the relationship between law and spatiality, and a
material justice, then we have to address the question of the political.
I begin with an overview of the concepts of fold and orientation in the work of Deleuze
and Guattari because they are significant to the ways in which PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos understands the body and agency. Then I will address the concept of
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withdrawal and the assemblage, and I will conclude this section with the concept of a
‘responsibility of indistinction’ which demonstrates how we may think through the
concept of spatial justice from a political perspective.

2.3.1 Fold and Orientation
The ‘fold’ offers “an at once abstract and tactile sense of matter…at the crux of any
social practice.”103 As a monadic thinker, Deleuze is interested in the interior/exterior
dynamic present in the process of unfolding, and the new conceptualization of
subjectivity that this process entails.104 Following Leibniz’s thinking on continuums and
folds, Deleuze explains that “a fold is always folded within a fold,” and that “unfolding is
thus not the contrary of folding, but follows the fold up to the following fold.”105 Thus,
the process of unfolding is creative and generative, “whereas to fold is to diminish…‘to
withdraw into the recesses of a world.’”106 Unfolding is a process whereby the body (or
the monad) is exposed to the outside (or exteriority), and as such it engages in a process
of proliferation and redefinition. However, as Deleuze indicates, a simultaneous process
of folding results in a productive withdrawal, since to withdraw into the ‘recesses of a
world’ suggests the possible creation of a world into which the body may withdraw. I
posit that this interpretation is close to the notion of withdrawal suggested by
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos.
The movement inherent in the processes of folding and unfolding is noted in various
ways in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schitzophrenia, through the process of
deterritorialization and reterritorialization. In order to understand how the lawscape can
be reoriented, it is useful to understand how it is that Deleuze and Guattari treat the
concept of place and spatiality, which relates to these de/reterritorializations. Nomadic
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space is conceptualized as a “nonlimited locality,”107 namely a space which is not
traversed linearly, from point A to point B, but rather through a process of constant
readjustment and reorientation.108 The idea of nomadic space (or smooth space) brings to
the fore the significance of orientation: “the local operations of relay must be oriented by
the discovery (and often the continual rediscovery) of direction; otherwise, these
operations would be in vain.”109 Therefore, for Deleuze and Guattari, the ontological and
epistemological are indivisible, or as pithily stated by Ed Casey: “that where something is
situated has everything to do with how it is structured.”110 Casey further explains that the
figures that move through ‘smooth’ space engage the idea of “place-as-region”111 which
projects the body as capable of “existing through the entire region.”112 Therefore, the
body, as conceived by Deleuze and Guattari, breaks with the “bilaterality” inherent in an
orientation in Cartesian space, acknowledging that orientation can be accomplished
through “actions at ‘close range’….[and yet, that] there is a ‘contiguity’ with the ground
one is on.”113 Evidently, not all bodies are capable of engaging in these particular spatial
processes as the world is generally formed of both smooth and striated spaces; however,
the ability to engage in movement between these spaces gives us an idea of what kind of
action might be required to reorient the lawscape.
The distinct contribution of Deleuze’s thought to the question of subjectivity is centered
on the idea of situatedness or localization, but it is framed in such a way so as to eschew
the necessity of permanent emplacement by promoting the idea of negotiation and
regeneration. The foundational premise of the Deleuzo-Guattarian subject is movement,
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and as such, we begin to understand the event as a significant element in shaping the
subject. This concept should have lasting implications for legal subjectivity as well (as
political subjectivity), and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos presents us with a theory that
speaks to these implications. Therefore, the fold as the “reduction of variables to a ‘single
and unique variability’ of the touching or tangent curve”114 allows us to understand how
the distinct character of each body can be simultaneously localized and abstract (or
universal). According to Deleuze, this process is accomplished through the envelopment
or “inhesion” that is facilitated by the fold.115 Leibniz defines the monad as the “unity
that envelops multiplicity.”116 It is the ‘point of view’ that encapsulates an entire world,
but only expresses a particular part of it.117 He describes the process of creating the fold
as a torsion between the world and the soul (or the subject), highlighting an indistinction
at the heart of the production of monadic bodies.

2.3.1.1

Folding and Unfolding in the Lawscape

The processes of folding and orientation provide a direction for the political project at the
heart of this theory of spatial justice. The fold is both the metaphorical and material
(virtual and real) manifestation of withdrawal. It gives shape to the assemblages or bodies
that form within the continuum of the lawscape, and thus, the process of folding (or
rather unfolding) has a significant influence on the ways in which the lawscape can be
reoriented.
The lawscape is defined as “the way the ontological tautology between law and space
unfolds as difference.”118 This definition reflects the dynamism and movement of law, as
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well as a constitutive tension or conflict. The lawscape is the ‘place’ where the material
and immaterial dimensions of law meet, and it marks the site where bodies fold and
unfold into existence. The lawscape is simultaneously dynamic and situated; it can be
changed and reoriented, and yet, it also reflects the stability and shape of legal bodies.
The lawscape incorporates both an epistemological dimension, as it expresses
differentiation between bodies, and captures their presence (whether visible or invisible)
in the moment of rupture, and, it also incorporates ontological characteristics, as a
continuum that reflects indistinction and the possible emergence of bodies. This is the
crux of the onto-epistemological theory that is central to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’
project, the emergence and withdrawal of bodies. The lawscape is like the ‘place-region’
because “the law in the lawscape emanates from every body without any origin.”119

2.3.1.2

(Un)folding and Withdrawal

The processes of folding and unfolding that are taking place through the continuum and
within the lawscape contribute to an ontological withdrawal, which is central to
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theory of spatial justice. This particular theorization of
withdrawal is influenced by Graham Harman’s definition of the concept. Harman argues
that objects constantly withdraw into an “infinite recess” and as they do, they leave
behind ‘qualities’ and ‘notes’ that are meant to reflect that sensual and cultural
characteristics of these objects, respectively.120 Harman’s withdrawal refers to a
productive interiority, an inner world or something akin to an unconscious at the level of
matter. The object of object-oriented ontology is properly out of reach, cannot be
‘known’, and rather, all we ‘know’ are these ‘qualities’ and ‘notes’ the objects leave
behind.
As I mentioned above, Deleuze understands withdrawal as a movement towards the
‘recesses of a world’. It is a description that leaves us with the image of a very particular
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representation of a narrowly understood and specific world. Therefore, although this is a
creative process, it is also suggestive of closure and definition. The unsettling or catalyst
for a creative process however seems to have a different source for Deleuze and Guattari
and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, one privileging openness and the other closure, or
self-destruction/self-overcoming (Nietzsche) and self-preservation (Spinoza).121 Yet,
when we look closer at Deleuze’s theory, and we consider the role of the fold, we
immediately understand that the processes of deterritorialization (which produce the
openness that defines Deleuze’s writing) are not necessarily linked to an interiority or
exteriority, rather they operate at the border, the skin, or strata of the fold. I argue that the
question of openness versus closure sets up a false theoretical binary, and that it is the
process and movement that bears more significance to the onto-epistemological
production of bodies and subjectivities. A return to the material conditions through which
these bodies are performed provides some insight into how this relationship can be
overcome.
This spatial and material dimension of justice allows us to break through the image of the
legal body as an individual unit, and to think of it in terms of its relations, its processes of
formation (both ontological and epistemological), and ultimately its

ecolonizatio.

Through this theory of justice we are able to understand the material context that sustains
these social, political and legal interactions, especially because we can no longer ignore
our presence within this world. It captures the socio-political context and the material
context, and as such, the theory of spatial justice and the responsibility of indistinction
create a very useful vehicle for thinking about law and justice. As PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos reminds us: “only from within matter can law control.”122

2.3.2 Withdrawal and Assemblage
Withdrawal, as conceptualized by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, is premised on bodies’
engagement in a negotiation of space, and their subsequent emergence. In this sense,

121

Paul Patton, Deleuze and the Political (New York: Routledge, 2000), 50.

122

Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice, 66.

47

withdrawal (as a form of becoming) allows us to see a political ontology emerging across
the lawscape. These withdrawing bodies (or legal assemblages) are operating in a mix of
human/nonhuman relations, indeed challenging traditional legal definitions of agency,
and yet, engaging in spatio-legal practices that are properly understood to be political. In
order to consider the future of political and legal thought, it is important to look closely at
how these ‘lively agencies’ and assemblages operate.
The bodies that form on the continuum of the lawscape are assemblages, defined by their
relationships and the productive contexts, rather than their characteristics. This allows us
to understand the human, not as a unit, but rather, “as a set of intensive and extensive
qualities that can be natural/technological, non/human, in/organic, im/material and so on,
with which the human gathers into spatiotemporal assemblages.”123 The assemblage, and
its perpetual movement and negotiation of spaces, demonstrates the body’s ability to
simultaneously engage in closure and openness: “the body as a singularity that is
permanently withdrawn.”124 As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos further explains:
“A body is understood as an assemblage of various conditions and materialities –
we are isolated things; skin does not separate us from the world; otherness is not
over there but very much with us, on us, in us…Rigid separation is an
epistemological construct, often a necessity, according to the foundational fantasy
of distinction between self and environment”125
As assemblages bodies become situated in space, and through their movement (whether
withdrawal or becoming) they produce these spaces. This is the performative action that
rests at the heart of how bodies express their agential capabilities, and the key to how we
may understand the relationship between spatial justice and politics.
Deleuze and Guattari formulated the assemblage as an alternative to subjectivity as it
emerged within structuralist frameworks. In order to challenge the static nature of being,
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they focused on the idea of becoming as a process that is capable of bringing language to
the level of the material:
“the way an expression relates to a content is not by uncovering or representing it.
Rather, forms of expression and forms of content communicate through a
conjunction of their quanta of relative deterritorialization, each intervening,
operating in the other.”126
Therefore, we begin to see that performativity is linked to becoming, and becoming is
itself linked to movement. The assemblage (and the body) is significant for Deleuze and
Guattari because they claim that although the implications of politics occur at a larger
scale, the decision-making is taking place at a molecular level.127 There is a constant
relationship between the molar and molecular dimensions of society in their view, and
these processes of negotiation and influence give rise to a particular manifestation of
political thinking and action.

2.3.3 Responsibility of Indistinction
The conceptualization of withdrawal has further implications with respect to how it is
that we can think about responsibility in the age of the Anthropocene, as PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos urges us to do. Through the concept of the responsibility of indistinction,
we are tasked with thinking about the relations that form between bodies and that define
the scope of our actions. The responsibility of indistinction is a concept derived from
Karen Barad’s writing on posthuman bodies and the networks and connections they
sustain through assemblages. It is premised on the idea that the human body as an
assemblage that is part of its environment in a more biologically dynamic sense. Barad
argues that rather than thinking that the body now lacks agential capacity, in fact, it has a
heightened responsibility to be attuned and attentive to its environment. The
‘responsibility of indistinction’ is a call to understand the human as one of many bodies,
in a situated material context, and on the same level as the environment. Yet, does the

126

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, translated
by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 88.
127

Ibid., 222.

49

responsibility of indistinction mean that we must claim that there is no outside? Is the
answer to ethical action and spatial justice the recognition that we inhabit a perpetually
differentiating inside that is constantly attempting to reorganize itself in order to appease
particular bodies simply because they ‘weigh’ more?128
In “And for Law”, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos clarifies his position with respect to
agency and the responsibility of indistinction by indicating that bodies can identify
noxious assemblages that they must not only withdraw from, but must also actively
resist.129 I think this statement entails an imperative for orientation, and something that
happens on a material, affective level. If a body can identify ‘noxious’ assemblages
suggests that these assemblages are a direct affront to the material integrity of a body, and
that they are both of an environmental and political nature.
The intimate connection between Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ writing and that of
Deleuze and Guattari provides an indication of the presence of politics within the concept
of spatial justice. The presence and necessity of thinking politically through this concept
is further evidenced through the concept of ‘lively agency’ which I will look at more
closely in the next section. It is through this concept that we may come to understand
how bodies perform spatial justice.

2.4
Performing Spatial Justice: Lively Agencies and
the Reorientation of the Lawscape
Performing spatial justice allows us to understand how it is that we can capture political
agency within the ambit of the lawscape. The idea that justice or law are political is a
problematic concept within legal discourse. In order to maintain its impartiality, law
cannot be understood to be political, even though political relations influence the
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operation of the law. However, the theory of justice presented by PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos has granted an opportunity to (re)analyze this fraught, but intimate
relationship between law and politics, and arguably, to determine more fruitful ways to
engage with law politically.
One of the main reasons this can be accomplished is the fact that spatial justice is
immanent, rather than deferred.130 Spatial justice is also material and produced, and as
such, it is an event that unfolds at the level of the body, out of the emergence of legal
assemblages, and their particular, special positioning within the lawscape.
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos does not want to reduce the emergence and differentiation
of these bodies to mere political conflict, which is why he notes that his concept should
not be confused with an impoverished definition of identity politics, limited by a
representation of bodies within monolithic categories.131 However, the tilted nature of the
continuum and the struggle for space between the bodies on the lawscape are indicative
of more than just an ontological distinction, and rather, mark a reflection of power and
agency. Politics is not something that we can also read alongside this theory of law and
spatiality, rather politics is something that must be read as an integral part of the
theory.132

2.4.1 What are Lively Agencies?
In order to understand how bodies perform spatial justice, we must turn to the concept of
‘lively agency’ and its relationship to responsibility and justice. According to
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, liveliness is
“the absolute difference of each individual body [which] emerges under paradoxical
conditions: each body, namely each singularity, is both ‘withdrawn’ and gathered in
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itself (for how else would it be singular), and at the same time connected to other
singularities (for how else could it carry on).”133
Lively bodies withdraw to ensure that the continuum is ruptured, and new bodies are
presented “depending on the particular combination of bodies participating in it.” 134 The
simultaneous movement of bodies towards interiority and exteriority (withdrawal and
connection) suggests that agency is also connected to responsibility because the body is
always caught up in an assemblage, it is always responsive to other bodies.
Lively agency and the continuum (as well as the lawscape) are closely connected.
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos described the agential capability of bodies as: “vessel
through which the law emerges, since each body is responsible for its position in relation
to the wider assemblage.”135 Responsibility emerges as the position of the body is
established, and it is responsive to that context and those other bodies. In this sense, it is
performative. It is the product of the relations that give rise to a particular assemblage. It
is through the assemblage that we come to understand how and why a body could act,
and could be acted upon by the processes that sustain the lawscape.
Lively agency denotes how bodies are engaged in rupturing processes in the first place,
which is why Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos turns to Karen Barad’s concept of “‘agential
separability’ to signal the need for boundaries between bodies.”136 These boundaries are
formed as the continuum is folded to give shape to the bodies within, and through this
process an agential position emerges.137 This is closely connected to the idea of
responsibility because it is also formed in relation to the assemblage. The “call to
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justice”, as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos indicates, is contextualized, and responsive to
the environment and relationships that gave shape to the body in the first place.138
A body’s lively agency is closer to the notion of an “affective ability.”139 It is through
understanding how bodies move, and “whether and to what extent they can form
assemblages that respond to environmental conditions in a way that results in conative
perpetuation,”140 that we begin to grasp this distinct form of agency. Lively agency does
not denote an individual choice, nor does it denote a position that results from the
institution bodies might find themselves related to, instead it is material and emplaced,
and expressed through a relationship between human and nonhuman assemblages. Lively
agency, then, is an important aspect of this continuous process of assemblage building
that takes place within the lawscape. As bodies shift and re-position themselves, they reestablish their responsibility to each other, and continuously re-define the possibility for
spatial justice.

2.4.2 Lively Agencies and the Reorientation of the Lawscape
The lawscape can only be reoriented as a result of the movement and re-organization of
the bodies within it, and spatial justice can only emerge if the reorientation of a lawscape
reverberates through other lawscapes. This event is not abstract, as in a shift in the law
that is removed from its material context, rather it occurs through a material engagement
with the world. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos privileges matter because it brings us a
richer understanding of the implications of the abstract dimension of law allowing us to
understand the full capacity and implications of the law. He notes that a
“critical reading of autopoiesis, which, however does not succumb to critique but
carries on by unfolding itself along the object of its attention, moves alongside its

138

Ibid., 203.

139

Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice, 154.

140

Ibid., 154.

53

body and employs its folds in order to construct concepts and conceptual practices
that aim at a different reality.”141
This practice is not exclusively ontological, and it relies on a material-discursive practice,
a performance or a practice that enacts it within the world, reproduces it, and gives shape
to the social, political, and environmental conditions of existence.
If we understand law and space as mutually constitutive of each other, then politics is the
element that provokes their emergence. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos describes it as
excess, but this is only if we understand politics as the partisan discourses that clash in
negotiation, rather than politics as constitutive of the relations and practices that facilitate
material existence. Therefore, these processes are not autopoietic in the Luhmannian
sense, rather, borrowing from Deleuze, they form a dynamic relationship between
interior/exterior, so that the innermost layers are the most dynamic. Deleuze introduced
this through the plane of immanence (which is similar to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’
continuum) and if we consider his theories closely, we note that he advances processes of
de-stabilization. It is helpful to think about it in terms of the permeability and processes
of movement that occur within this boundary. In this sense, we begin to see correlations
between Deleuze’s thought and that of Graham Harman’s theory of withdrawal. They
both harken back to a moving, dynamic and ever-shifting layer, that becomes ordered, if
only briefly, while maintaining the potentiality of change. This element of
‘unpredictability’ holds the key to the bodies’ ability to effect a reorientation of the
lawscape.142
Spatial justice is premised on a movement and transformation of the current conditions of
a lawscape; but it does not guarantee a better world, just a different one.143 The process of
withdrawal depends on an “articulated strategy”144 that takes place in physical as well as
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symbolic places. Spatial justice emerges when we are presented with the possibility of a
‘new’ world, and when that has an impact by resulting in a production of space.145 Yet, as
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos reminds us,
“any reorientation of space can only occur through repeated encounters with other
bodies. Such encounters take place on the space of withdrawal from the atmospherics
of the existing lawscape. No doubt the new lawscape needs to prove its relevance. But
spatial justice as an emergence takes place regardless of the validity of the new
lawscape. It is enough to reorient the lawscape towards its new validation.”146
The process of reorientation is marked by a material-discursive (performative) practice
that attempts to claim a resistance through withdrawal from the atmosphere that
dissimulates conflict. However, it is through a negotiation of places within the
atmosphere that this can be made possible. These engagements between bodies, the
negotiations of material spaces, and processes that think and create a different context,
each sustain the possibility of spatial justice. These practices, then, are indicative of a
form of politics, conceived as a struggle between bodies to affirm themselves, yet at the
same time, withdraw in order to perpetuate the processes of creation. Despite the fact that
the body withdraws into an interiority, it simultaneously gives shape to the body, and
places it in contact with an exteriority. The performance of spatial justice rests in these
processes of tension, redefinition and movement.

2.5

Conclusion

The processes of negotiation of space inherent in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ project
of spatial justice are indicative of a political practice that operates to precipitate the
possibility of spatial justice. This political practice influences the ruptures in the
continuum that may cause a reorientation of the lawscape. Drawing on Deleuze and
Guattari’s work I argued that withdrawal acts as a productive and creative force, much
like the processes of becoming conceptualized by these philosophers in their work. The
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productive and ultimately political negotiations denoted through withdrawal occur at the
interstices of a body’s negotiation of space.
In the next chapter, I draw a connection between Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos concept
of spatial justice and Indigenous resurgent practices to demonstrate how bodies can
engage in a performance of spatial justice. I will draw on the writings of John Borrows,
an Anishinaabe legal scholar, to show how the dynamic character of Indigenous law and
resurgent practice is demonstrative of a practice of spatial justice.
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Chapter 3

3

Performing Spatial Justice and Indigenous Resurgence

3.1 Introduction
The final chapter of the thesis will demonstrate how spatial justice can be approached as
a performative practice by engaging in a comparative analysis between Andreas
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theory of spatial justice and John Borrows’ writings on
freedom, Indigenous law and resurgence. A central objective of this thesis is to
understand the implications of engaging the idea of legal subjectivity in relation to a
grounded or material legal practice. Spatial justice offers an entry point into a discussion
of law and justice that engages with the role of the nonhuman or the more-than-human.
John Borrows’ writings on freedom and Indigenous legal philosophy (or as he calls it,
‘physical philosophy’) allows us to grasp a practice of spatial justice. Also, it is not a
coincidence that Borrows’ writings, and Indigenous legal philosophy more generally, are
the source of a practice of spatial justice as their engagement with the more-than-human
permits the re-conceptualization of legal subjectivity. I believe this perspective on law
and legal practice can open up more fruitful discussions with respect to the future of
political lawyering.
Both Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and Borrows argue that law emerges through an
engagement with the world, rather than an experience of the world.147 I believe that this
fundamental point distinguishes their work from that of most legal geographers because
spatiality and materiality bear a distinct agential capability within these forms of legal
practice, and a performance of spatial justice is not limited to the human legal subject, but
rather it requires a situated relationality with other bodies, both human or more-than-
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human.148 This perspective affords a different understanding of ethics and responsibility,
which as Borrows and others have noted, is a cornerstone of Indigenous traditional
knowledge.149 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, drawing on posthumanism, identifies this
ethical relationship as the responsibility of indistinction.150 Although there are some
differences between these theories, in both cases, a relationship arises from a contextual,
grounded and contingent encounter, and through this material event or struggle, arises the
possibility of reorientation and spatial justice. The law is always grounded; it is never
only abstract.
As a non-Indigenous person, my familiarity with Indigenous law and knowledge is
limited to the research undertaken to write this chapter. Although I believe this thesis
contributes to legal scholarship related to both spatial justice and Indigenous law, I
understand that certain nuances or perspectives might be side-stepped because I do not
have a lived or learned experience of Indigenous knowledge and traditions. In particular,
I want to note that while I make use of the broader term of more-than-human and
compare it to the non-human or lively agency in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ work, I
do not mean to equate the two. I will employ the term more-than-human, primarily in
relation to Indigenous scholarship, while the term nonhuman will be used in reference to
the work of posthumanists.
Also, the term Indigenous peoples has often been used as a monolith, thus failing to
account for the various forms of traditional knowledge and the different approaches taken
by different Nations. I do not mean to replicate this with the term Indigenous law. I did
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consider whether using Indigenous legal traditions or legal orders would be a more
appropriate term, or whether I could state that I am working only on Anishinaabe law;
however, neither of those felt appropriate in this context because I do not have a
sufficient understanding of Anishinaabe law to make specific claims, and because I
believe that the project of spatial justice in relation to the concept of resurgence can be
applied more broadly. In order to capture this dynamic, I chose to focus on Indigenous
law as an umbrella term, but I do not want it to suggest that there is one way, or one
particular practice that defines the experiences of all Indigenous peoples in Canada.
The first part of this chapter outlines aspects of Indigenous legal theory that will be used
to advance my argument. As I mentioned earlier, this chapter is centered on the work of
John Borrows whose writing on Anishinaabe law and practice is outlined in various
books, notably Drawing Out Law: A Spirits’ Guide and Freedom and Indigenous
Constitutionalism. The former, which is both personal reflection and rigorous theorizing,
weaves dreams, stories, anecdotes and law to bring us closer to an understanding of
Indigenous knowledge, its processes of world-making, and the idea of agency. Borrows’
work provides a starting point from which to think about justice and responsibility in
relation to the more-than-human, and to understand why this is an important step in
advancing broader social justice objectives.
The second part of this chapter will mark the crossroads between Indigenous law and a
practice of spatial justice by providing a comparative analysis of the relationship between
Indigenous resurgence and agency, and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ Spinozist
interpretation of withdrawal as an onto-epistemological movement. This section draws on
my writing in the second chapter and helps us locate the conditions of possibility for
political agency within the ethical and legal frameworks of Indigenous law and spatial
justice. In this section, I will also build on the comparison between resurgence and
withdrawal to discuss what a practice of spatial justice (or reorientation of the lawscape)
may look like. This section engages more closely with the concept of freedom as a
practice in the context of the struggle to engage with ideas of reconciliation and
resurgence beyond state recognition.
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The third section of this chapter will address two case-studies in order to demonstrate
how spatial justice can be performed. The first case-study will engage with Rebecca
Belmore’s performance art piece, Facing the Monumental, which took place at Queen’s
Park on Canada Day in 2012. The second case-study is an analysis of discussions
surrounding the ‘rule of law’ within the context of the recent Wet’suwet’en and
Unist’ot’en protests against the Coastal Gaslink Pipeline Ltd. In British Columbia.

3.2

Indigenous Legal Philosophy

Indigenous law has a variety of sources: ancient stories, customs and codes, historical
agreements with the Crown, Canadian common and civil law, constitutional law and
contemporary international instruments.151 This multiplicity of sources reflects the
complex legal and political reality of this area of law and it marks a commitment to
understanding a contemporary and evolving definition of Indigenous law, which serves to
counter a colonialist understanding of Indigenous law and traditions as fixed in the
past.152 The persistent obstruction of the validity of contemporary claims made by
Indigenous peoples underscores the continuing damage caused by a settler colonial
mentality, and it diminishes the positive influence of Indigenous legal philosophy on
contemporary legal and political theory.
In the last half-decade, the Canadian legal landscape has seen an increased interest in the
future of Indigenous rights and the role of Indigenous law alongside the common law
system. In 2014, Beverly McLachlin, Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Canada stated that the future of Canadian constitutional law will be shaped by aboriginal
rights, rather than the Charter, denoting the high court’s intention to focus on clarifying
the parameters of s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and make substantial steps towards
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reconciliation.153 In September 2018, the University of Victoria Faculty of Law
inaugurated its Joint Degree Program in Canadian Common Law and Indigenous Legal
Orders. This program is the first of its kind in the world.154 These hopeful steps are
shifting legal discourse surrounding Indigenous rights in Canada, as well as the
application of Indigenous legal philosophical concepts to Canadian law, and they mark an
effort to contribute to the project of decolonization of the Canadian settler state.
These varied sources of Indigenous law demonstrate how legal practice can operate at
different levels and in different contexts, outside what is commonly associated with the
legal realm (our common law systems of legal practice). Indigenous constitutionalism has
started to shift common law discourses, notably in the way common law jurisprudence on
Indigenous rights is recognizing the validity of Indigenous legal traditions.155 Yet, despite
this progress, tensions and problems within processes of recognition and reconciliation
complicate and oftentimes obstruct more transformative efforts towards selfdetermination.156 I argue that the application and proliferation of Indigenous law is
important to this struggle for self-determination, and it is useful to think through the ways
in which the objectives of spatial justice lend themselves to legal and political
transformation that can acknowledge and further the contributions of Indigenous legal
philosophy.
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Before I continue this chapter, I note that there is a largely unacknowledged debt to the
relational ontologies of Indigenous philosophy in forms of Western philosophical
thought, including the texts of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.157 Arguably, this fact
also contributes to the similarities between Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s posthuman
take on spatial justice which is largely driven by a Deleuzian analysis, and Anishinaabe
conceptions of the more-than-human which are present in John Borrows’ work, as well as
that of other Indigenous scholars. I will not address this further because it is beyond the
scope of my research, but I believe it is important to acknowledge this point.
As I note above, this chapter’s views of Indigenous law are informed primarily by
Anishinaabe law, as John Borrows is a member of the Chippewas of the Nawash First
Nation at Neyaashiinigmiing (Cape Crocker Indian Reserve) and his writing is influenced
primarily by Anishinaabe legal traditions.158 The Anishinaabeg are the second-largest
Indigenous group in Canada, and their territory spans the Great Lakes region, parts of
northern Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, as well as parts of the northern United
States.159
My interest in spatial justice in relation to Indigenous law stems from the fact that
Indigenous legal thinking is already well-positioned to consider the mutual constitutivity
of law and space and, as such, it can shed light on how we may approach the
shortcomings of our legal system through a practice of spatial justice. The next subsections outline a few key concepts in Indigenous legal philosophy that will demonstrate
how it relates to the concept of spatial justice.

3.2.1 ‘Physical’ Philosophy
In Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, John Borrows introduces the idea of
Indigenous law as a ‘physical’ philosophy or akinoomaagewin which is premised on a
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continuous practice of grounded or Earth-related emancipatory traditions.160 It is an
approach that suggests an analysis of an experience of the world, and in a sense, it might
be interpreted as a phenomenology.161 The performative nature of this practice is driven
by a resistance to the status quo. Borrows calls this a “settled flux”, meaning “our
perpetual motion coexists with a persistent and enduring near-permanence.”162 The
physicality of Anishinaabe philosophy enacts grounded, but mobile agents, who are
formed through both material and abstract processes. This perspective acts as a departure
from the fixed and unitary legal subjects of the common law, which are framed
abstractly, through the relationship they share over land, rather than with it. For this
reason, how one’s relationship to the land is framed (and subsequently, how we
understand legal subjectivity) impacts the ethical perspective and practice of the legal and
political agents, and eventually, the ability to produce social and political change through
legal frameworks.
There are two guiding principles for a practice of ‘physical’ philosophy according to
Borrows: dibenindizowin and mino-bimaadiziwin, which mean, respectively, that “a
person possesses liberty within themselves and their relationships,” and “living a good
life.”163 Although many works on Indigenous law, including Borrows’ writing on the
subject, are focused on governance, harmonization and community-building framed
around various values and principles, these do not act as rigid a priori categories that
impose a universal moral order onto the agents of Indigenous law.164 What he describes
as this ‘physical’ philosophical approach is more so aligned with an ethical practice, and
in this sense, I believe it reflects some of the ways in which Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos
conceptualizes bodies’ movement and engagements within the lawscape. There is no
guarantee that the form of action undertaken will have the desired results, which is why
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he proposes a contextualized, practice-oriented understanding of Indigenous law that is
flexible and adaptable.
This perspective of Indigenous knowledge as a form of ‘place-based’ ethical practice is
similar to what Glen S. Coulthard calls grounded normativity.165 He argues that
“land…[is] an ontological framework for understanding relationships” between humans
and nonhumans.166 By engaging with the law in a grounded way (i.e. by drawing it out
with the natural surroundings, rocks, trees, water, and land) we begin to understand that
there is no “jurisprudential center of the universe” that is ‘the human’.167 This perspective
on law deviates from the liberal theoretical norm of legal subjectivity centered on human
experience and the rest of the world as mere resource for human consumption and use.
This de-centering of the human legal subject is a central premise of PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos’ writing as well, and both mark a new horizon for the practice of law, and
for conceptualizations of the ‘subject’ of law.
As I noted in earlier chapters, spatial justice, a product of the reorientation of the
lawscape, does not necessarily occur when a lawscape is reoriented. The shift must be
transformative, and as such, it must resonate across several lawscapes. Through his
analysis of examples of direct action undertaken by various First Nations communities
across Canada, we could argue that Borrows identifies successful and less successful
attempts to attain spatial justice through a reorientation of the lawscape.168 He provides
insights into the varied and complex strategies employed in these cases, and suggests
which have been successful and which have not. This approach demonstrates that certain
practices, in this case direct action and the setting up of blockades, are not always
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successful, and that outcomes may differ depending on the history, timing and context of
each First Nation.

3.2.2 Agency, Freedom and Resurgence
Agency, according to Borrows, means living according to one’s vision within a network
of people.169 It is a recognition of the independence and interdependence of living in a
community, and the mutual respect and responsibility that emerge from that
relationship.170 This definition of agency rests at the core of Borrows’ idea of a situated
freedom: freedom as practice and experience, rather than an abstract concept (or in a
liberal philosophical sense, freedom as property, thus fixed and owned).171 This
perspective on agency and freedom emerges because of the way in which spatiality and
the relationship between human and more-than-human bodies is framed in Anishinaabe
law. Although it is grounded, this form of agential practice relies on mobile, rather than
fixed agents.172 Agency, then, becomes a fundamental concept for Borrows’ theories on
Indigenous self-determination and resurgent practice through stories, experiences, and
relationships with (and within) the environment.
Despite the presence of guiding or universal principles and values in Indigenous thought,
Borrows rejects the moral universalism of liberal philosophy in large part because it has
been persistently utilized as a mechanism to justify and further advance the dispossession
of Indigenous peoples through processes of annihilation and assimilation. Rather, these
guiding principles form the basis of an ethical subjectivity, and not a moral order.
Therefore, he seeks a different path for Indigenous law in Canada, and presents an
alternative to the liberal theoretical foundation that informs our legal systems.
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Therefore, Borrows rejects the spatial and politico-legal configurations of property
relations within liberal societies as they have been applied in Indigenous contexts, and he
contends that the framing of an a priori Indigenous identity has limited the contemporary
realities and experiences of Indigenous people.173 These traditions can adapt and change
over time to fit the needs of their communities. Stories are re-told to respond to
contemporary needs, and new stories are crafted to provide guidance with respect to new
issues. Indigenous traditions are not static, and political rhetoric and legal judgments that
have attempted to limit them as such have had a negative impact on Indigenous
communities’ ability to flourish.
Resurgent practice and freedom are closely related, and they are important to
understanding how spatial justice may apply in this context. Leanne Betasamosake
Simpson, a Miichi Saagig Nishnaabeg scholar and poet, describes resurgent practices as:
“Biiskabiyang— the process of returning to ourselves, a reengagement with the things
we have left behind, a re-emergence, an unfolding from the inside out— is a concept,
an individual and collective process of decolonization and resurgence. To me, it is the
embodied processes as freedom. It is a flight out of the structure of settler colonialism
and into the processes and relationships of freedom and self- determination encoded
and practiced within Nishnaabewin or grounded normativity… My flight to escape
colonial reality was a flight into Nishnaabewin. It was a returning, in the present, to
myself. It was an unfolding of a different present. It was freedom as a way of being as
a constellation of relationships, freedom as world making, freedom as a practice. It
was biiskabiyang.”174
This is a necessary part of the practice or resurgence according to Simpson, and it is a
significant step towards decolonial practice.
Glen S. Coulthard, following Franz Fanon’s anticolonial theories, also argues that the
development of a radical praxis necessitates a “turning away” or a process of “selfrecognition.”175 According to him, ressentiment is a necessary step in a process of
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decolonization because it acts as a catalyst for rupture from processes of colonial
subjection. However, Coulthard argues that Fanon’s theory of ressentiment is not the
same thing as resentment, which is simply reactionary or oppositional, rather it is a
productive and ‘self-affirmative’ process.176 Whether we consider a ‘turning inward’ or
‘biiskabiyang’ or ‘withdrawal’ the process bears significance because it is capable of
creating a stepping-stone towards a “more just relationship.”177 For this reason, Coulthard
does not view reconciliation as the solution to Indigenous peoples’ current struggles
within a settler colonial context, and offers resurgence as the alternative, almost as a
development of a cultural collective consciousness, that can be approached both at the
individual and group level in order to advance the interests of Indigenous peoples.178
And, I would highlight, that this is a significantly spatial and material project, as
Coulthard himself notes the significance of the use of blockades as mechanisms for
asserting Indigenous sovereignty.179
Further, an early theorist of resurgence, Taiaiaike Alfred, who defined resurgence in the
context of Indigenous sovereignty, argued that it is necessary not only to regain political
space, but to fill it up with Indigenous content.180 Along with Jeff Corntassel, Alfred
argues that,
“Indigenous pathways of authentic action and freedom struggle start with people
transcending colonialism on an individual basis – a strength that soon reverberates
outward from self to family, clan, community and into all of the broader relationships
that form an Indigenous existence. In this way, Indigenousness is reconstructed,
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reshaped and actively lived as resurgence against the dispossessing and demeaning
processes of annihilation that are inherent to colonialism.”181
These views of resurgence offer an alternative to a particularly ineffective (and ultimately
harmful) form of reconciliation, which has been persistently exemplified by the Canadian
government.182 Oftentimes, the concept of reconciliation has either been deferred or it has
been interpreted as form of acceptance within the ambit of the Canadian nation state with
little desire or action towards structural change and mutual respect. This type of action
has led Indigenous scholars, like Coulthard, to oppose reconciliation outright (and to
declare it a failed project) because it depends on a politics of recognition, which means
that it is always dependent on the goodwill of the settler state. Borrows, on the other
hand, advocates for a simultaneous process of resurgence and reconciliation.183 Although
he does not support a non-transformative form of reconciliation, Borrows disagrees with
Coulthard’s more radical project because he is attempting to frame his analysis in terms
of a collective effort that recognizes the tension between independence and
interdependence.184 According to Borrows, Indigenous peoples must move from “critique
to construction,” and seek out “‘transformative’ reconciliation [which] must be
empowered by robust practices of resurgence.”185
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This perspective sets up Borrows’ notion of ‘situated freedom’. The idea of situated
freedom acknowledges
“that we are all differently situated and governed, in both constraining and
enabling ways, in relationships of division, patriarchy, imperialism, racism,
capitalism, ecological devastation, and poverty.”186
He prefers this approach because it is capable of capturing nuance and complexity, and
more likely to produce transformative change. Borrows argues for a response to
Indigenous issues that is sensitive to context and seeks the best practice, not necessarily
the most reactionary one. As he and James Tully note, the process of resurgence and
reconciliation,
“requires attentiveness and attunement and must move beyond the simplistic
models and metaphors standardly used to mis-describe and dominate the field
from one perspective or another…Layers of meaning and ambiguity reside in any
system of instruction and practice, and they embrace the social as well as the
physical activity of construction.”187
Therefore, to be of ‘one mind’ in this context does
“not seem to refer to complete agreement, but to understanding each other,
holding all views in tension. Then reconciliation negotiations began. So this form
of dialogue can be seen as a pathway of and to reconciliation.”188
Although these accounts of resurgence and freedom do not always overlap, I believe they
support the same goal of bringing forward transformative social change through a
concerted revitalization and affirmation of Indigenous knowledge in a variety of ‘scapes’.
Yet resurgence is not necessarily done outside of settler colonialism or simply in
opposition to it. Rather, I would argue that it is closer to a conative process that operates
simultaneously as a means of affirming Indigenous knowledge, and demonstrating how it
shifts and adapts to contemporary contexts. Through this operation, it demonstrates the
lasting presence of Indigenous knowledge in sites that have been imbued with the
authority of the settler state. Resurgence acts as a mechanism to perpetually challenge,
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disrupt and reveal alternative spatial configurations that are taken for granted within the
nation state. I will take this up again in the final section of this chapter, when I discuss
Rebecca Belmore’s performance piece, Facing the Monumental (2012), which
demonstrates what resurgent practice looks like and how we can see the reorientation of
the lawscape, and the potential for spatial justice.

3.2.3 The More-Than-Human of ‘All Our Relations’
The relational philosophy of Indigenous thought is premised on the idea that more-thanhuman entities share an equal footing with human entities within the larger legal and
political framework of Indigenous communities. At its core rests the notion of ‘all our
relations’ which prioritizes a relationship of responsibility and mutual respect within
inter-human relationships, as well as human and more-than-human relationships. This
idea has been extended into discussions about law, especially within the context of
environmental justice, but it can hold greater implications in terms of the contributions of
Indigenous legal orders to common law systems. As Borrows reminds us: “Reconciliation
between Indigenous peoples and the Crown requires our collective reconciliation with the
earth.”189
The pursuit of a decentered human subjectivity is a familiar premise of critical legal
theory contexts, and as such, it appears unusual that discussions on posthumanism within
this context have eschewed the topic of the more-than-human and the influence of
Indigenous theory. Although the concept has been recently taken up in discussions on
spatial justice, particularly in environmental studies and legal geography contexts,190 it is
oftentimes incorporated as an attribute of Western theoretical perspectives. I believe that
this reluctance to engage with the contributions of Indigenous thought in a substantial
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manner reflects a gap in critical legal scholarship. Perhaps this is due to the fact that, as
Regna Darnell notes, it is difficult to find a way to have these disparate theories speak to
each other.191 However, I expect that John Borrows and other Indigenous legal scholars
would differ, as much of their scholarship has attempted to find ways to incorporate
Indigenous philosophy in a substantial way within common law systems. Nonetheless,
with respect to critical legal theory, and the challenges it poses to liberal legal thought, I
believe that Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ work on spatial justice provides us with a
glimpse into how these disciplines may be bridged, though in both cases it requires a
challenge to liberal legal formulations.
We must be wary, however, of the more-than-human marking merely another way of
discussing the nonhuman of posthumanism (i.e. animate and inanimate organisms,
technology, objects). Borrowing from Robertson, I argue that these engagements do not
“‘think of the land in that way.’”192 The more-than-human presents an important element
of the relational ontology that defines Indigenous practices. As Sean Robertson explains
with respect to Secwepemc understandings of Indigenous knowledge and the land,
“[they] have not simply (biophysical) relationships with the land. They also have a coconstitutive relationship with it that shapes their being, informs their doings and orients
their ethics to the collective…”193 These relations form the ground of traditional
Indigenous knowledge, and they guide legal and political practices. Although there are
overlaps in terms of the sense of collectivity and interdependence they do not reflect
indistinction in the posthuman sense.
An important contribution of Indigenous philosophy’s perspective on interdependence
through the concept of ‘all of our relations’ is the shift in understanding the human
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relationship to the land, and the legal implications this formulation of human subjectivity
holds. While liberal legal theory understands land as resource to be extracted for human
use and profit regardless of the impact this may have on the sustainability of other
entities, Indigenous philosophy, by capturing a relationship of interdependence with the
land intergenerationally is able to frame a different subjective position. The de-centering
of the human legal subject is a necessary step in finding ways to engage more equitably
within legal landscapes. If agency and freedom can be extended to the more-than-human,
then:
“Rocks, water, plants, insects, birds, animals, and humans with little social,
economic, or political power must be part of this circle of care. Freedom for these
ones often requires that we restrain ourselves rather than exploit them as resources for
our own selfish purposes.”194
Furthermore, as Borrows and others have noted, this is a necessary and fundamental step
in the process of reconciliation. Acknowledging the interdependence of human and morethan-human beings can promote better living within communities and states, and this
must be incorporated within larger legal discourses.195 The ‘physical’ philosophical
premise of this relationality is that “being is ‘being-with’” and this ethical standpoint can
facilitate forms of “transformative reconciliation” which may be either “constructive,
obstructive, and contestatory,” but will ultimately lead to “a critical mass of networked
practices that transform vicious systems into virtuous ones.”196
Sean Robertson’s interview with Secwepemc-Okanagan traditional land user, Dorothy
Christian provides a useful glimpse into what practice may mean in an ethical context
that gives deference to the more-than-human:
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“‘You don’t own the land: The land owns you. That is where our songs come
from, that is where our designs come from, that is where we come from. Our spirit
is integral to the land, it is a reciprocal relationship...’ You know when Indigenous
people say, ‘‘All my relations’’? It is not taken lightly, you are related to
everything in the universe: the trees, the birds, the four-leggeds, the little crawly
things, the water: you are related. It is like you take care of them, they will take
care of you. According to this relational geographical imagination, since
individuals ‘‘come from’’ (non)humans, freedom rests on support for ‘‘the
universe.’’”197
The mutual reciprocity inherent in these relationships creates a context that moves us
away from liberal legal theory’s understanding of the human subject and their
relationship over land as property, rather than their relationship with the land as agent.
However, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is also moving us away from this discussion
towards the materiality of law. He understands law as a practice that emerges with our
surroundings rather than law that is overlaid on them. This fundamental shift in
perspective regarding our relationship to the land gives rise to an ethical relationship
premised on interdependence and material practice. This marks the significance of
understanding a grounded (or material) legal relationship. We begin to see a number of
correlated themes between Indigenous legal philosophy and PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos’ theory of justice. Through storytelling as practice the land is oftentimes
conceptualized as a continuum onto which the onto-epistemological relationship unfolds.
Withdrawal then, as a turning towards the land, towards grounded knowledge, is a
simultaneous action of engagement with the material (and ontological) and at the same
time a production of knowledge (or epistemology).
Regna Darnell provides useful insight into how the ephemeral quality of everyday
practice can nonetheless be grounded. As she explains regarding the tensions between
Indigenous and Western philosophical systems,
“Both modes of knowing are systems: they form non-random patterns, even when
the critical variables are too complex to circumscribe. The fluid and contingent
may be a more effective way to live in the flux of day-to-day life, but it is equally
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necessary to have moorings in certainty that are akin to the non-negotiability of
(some) physical regularities, such as the intractability of the world/nature. The
question for moral philosophy, as for everyday affairs, is to recognize the
difference and respond appropriately, to keep the questions in balance and adapt
the methodology to the question(s) under consideration.”198
I note this because it reflects the kind of shift in thinking about moral philosophy (and
liberal legal theory) that Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is trying to accomplish through his
ideas on the materiality of law. However, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos explains how it
is that these ‘intractable’ material forms are nonetheless vulnerable or responsive to the
onto-epistemological influence of law, or how they are co-produced through those
encounters. And, in a sense, this perspective gives more due to the agency of those
material bodies that have liveliness and that contribute to the development of Indigenous
legal frameworks.
Through his reflection on the idea of ‘drawing out law’, Borrows acknowledges that the
natural world is not formed of “passive objects to be acted upon,” but rather that these
material bodies “had agency and a power of choice which they exercised every day. They
were subjects and actively participated in the world.”199 Practicing law in this way can
open up possibilities for social and political change that can hold significance beyond
Indigenous communities, and can shift frameworks within the broader Canadian context.
Before I end what is an already substantially lengthy introduction to Indigenous legal
philosophy, I do want to turn to the relationship between the more-than-human and
storytelling, as this plays an important role in the ethical practices at the heart of this
project. The trickster is a familiar figure in Indigenous story-telling that oftentimes brings
to light these ethical relationships. Nanabush, the figure of the trickster in Anishinaabe
lore, is a half-spirit half-human entity that travels the world and creates mischief for the
Anishinaabeg.200 He is a significant figure because he embodies the ethical perspective
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that runs through Indigenous law. Nanabush’s actions tend to bring to light the
complexities and ambivalences inherent in challenging situations in order to allow
individuals to engage with decision-making processes.201
Narrative, then, becomes an important part of Borrows’ theory of Indigenous law because
it contemplates alternatives and the possibility of thinking of a system of Indigenous law
that functions alongside the common law system.202 Story-telling shifts and changes to
accommodate the times. The figure of Nanabush engages in situations which suspend
decision-making in favour of thinking. They are not necessarily didactic (though we
could argue that they inform an ethical perspective), but they let the audience sit with a
problem, so that they may find their own path to it. That is the freedom (and autonomy)
that Borrows wants us to gather from Indigenous law. Although, as Charles Taylor notes,
narratives can serve to “deepen our understanding of abstract or broad principles by
contextualizing and making visible some of the ‘irreducible’ background they are
embedded in and emerge from,”203 they also serve to unsettle those very backgrounds.
In Drawing Out Law, Borrows uses the ambivalence of Indigenous story-telling to inform
his style of writing. The Trickster plays an important role in how social and political
situations are explored and analyzed. The Trickster is represented in various ways, such
as, a mischievous black dog that lives on the reserve or a conservative law professor at
University of Toronto. Borrows presents these characters as complex figures that disrupt
the direction and thinking of our main character, the author himself. The reader does not
interpret them as oppositional, rather as part and parcel of his experience, while they
challenge and disrupt his thinking/feeling/stories. This example is demonstrative of how
Indigenous philosophy treats conflict and contradiction.204
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3.2.4 Conclusion
The main objectives of this first section of the chapter are to explain what Indigenous law
is and what its relationship to Canadian law is, as well as to explain how it derives a
particular ethical practice from its understanding of our relationships with the more-thanhuman. I accomplish this introduction to this area of law by engaging with some of the
key concepts that I encountered through my research: ‘physical’ philosophy, agency and
‘situated freedom,’ and the more-than-human. Indigenous law is premised on a distinct
conceptualization of a body’s relationship to the natural environment, and in a sense to
spatiality, which holds significant implications for an understanding of legal subjectivity,
agency and ethics. Furthermore, Indigenous law, though premised on a grounded
normativity, is not fixed, as Western theory would understand it, but rather it is flexible,
adaptive and mobile.205 In this sense, I believe it is important to understand how it is that
Indigenous law presents us with an ethical framework that can aid in our understanding
of a practice of spatial justice.

3.3
Withdrawal and Resurgence: Toward a Practice of
Spatial Justice
The previous section outlined several key concepts which play an important role in our
understanding of Indigenous law, and attempted to demonstrate how Indigenous law
operates as a material legal practice, in particular through its relationship with the morethan-human. This section will be making the connection between these key concepts in
Indigenous law and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theory of spatial justice in order to
demonstrate how we can begin to think of a practice of spatial justice through the
operations of Indigenous law. Specifically, this section will compare and contrast
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ concept of withdrawal and the concept of Indigenous
resurgence.
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The other notable concepts which I would like to link to Indigenous law are the lawscape,
atmosphere and spatial justice. As I have mentioned before, PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos reframes the concept of spatial justice based on a desire to understand
spatiality as more than abstract and representational, and to open up new avenues for
understanding the transformative capabilities of spatial justice. I build on PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos’ theory to think through what a practice of spatial justice might mean. How
do we think of law and justice in a context of a posthuman legal subject, and how might
that limit or advance the attainment of justice? How can law capture the complex
contextuality of its subjects, as social and political actors, as well as legal actors? What is
the role of the nonhuman in this dynamic, and how can we consider the influence of
nonhuman legal agents? And, finally, what implications does this hold for the practice of
political lawyering? I believe that Indigenous legal philosophy and practice hold some of
the answers to these questions because Indigenous legal philosophy is premised on an
interrelatedness between human and more-than-human, and as such, it frames a distinct
relationship to space and spatiality. One of Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ main concepts,
withdrawal, provides a useful entry point in our discussion of a practice of spatial justice;
therefore, the rest of this section will focus on how we can understand withdrawal as a
practice that facilitates spatial justice, and how it can be related to Indigenous legal
philosophy through the practice of resurgence. This perspective will also allow us to
understand how spatial justice maintains its political character, despite its operation
through a relationship to the land.

3.3.1 Withdrawing from the Lawscape
Withdrawal into the continuum marks the shifting motions of the legal assemblages that
populate Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ lawscapes. In a sense, the lawscape is the
material and sensorial manifestation of the law.206 When Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos
states that law and space are mutually constitutive, he means to say that we could not
understand or experience the operation of the law outside of its spatial and material
manifestation. As legal subjects, we are produced through law’s grounding (or its spatial
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and material dimension). However, he also wants us to understand that space is not
simply the medium, but also a fully cooperating agent. Space and law are co-producing,
both discursively and materially. The law is simultaneously reproduced and affirmed
through the ways we inhabit and live through its constraints. The spatiality of law is
premised on inherent limits that give shape to social and political expression.207 And,
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos argues for a conceptualization of the law as an object or
system that operates beyond human (and allegedly, political) relations, which situates his
work askew to that of legal geographers. However, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos himself
stumbles over this hurdle when he tries to think about spatial justice, and he finds himself
always linking it back to the relationship to the human.208 More importantly though, I
believe we cannot escape the law as a human construct. Yet, despite the fact that it exists
as such, we can attempt to think the place of other agents within it, as it is a mechanism
that affects, and is affected by, these other agents, particularly the more-than-human
entities that appear within the context of Indigenous law as well. Therefore, we are
challenged to think of a de-centered human legal subject, but to engage with the
asymmetrical power relations and potential responsibility of that human subject at the
same time.
Withdrawal plays an important role in how Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos frames this
relationship. It is the ontological condition of the posthuman legal subject in his theory of
spatial justice. If all bodies engage in this simultaneous movement of making space and
taking up space, then we can understand that lawscapes, the sites where legal bodies (or
assemblages) emerge, can be reoriented or reconfigured. Building on deconstructionist
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theoretical perspectives on the ethics of withdrawal (e.g. Emmanuel Levinas)
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos attempts to capture the material and situated nature of
withdrawal, which he establishes through Deleuze’s concept of the fold, as I discussed in
the earlier chapter.
With respect to the process of withdrawal as practice, Luigi Russi provides us with a
useful definition of the movement at the heart of this onto-epistemological legal practice:
“withdrawal is, in other words, an instance of sensing the strings as propaedeutic to
new stirrings, and the stirrings as situated in a tenso-structure of strings, feeling the
pull of both and not making either invisible.”209
It is this capability of withdrawal as a means of uncovering and sitting with complexity
and contingency (or the history210) of a situation, in order to understand the implications
it holds for legal subjectivity and judgment. Indigenous story-telling, as a resurgent
practice, is a productive way of engaging with complexity and contingency in legal
contexts, not only because it draws on the past, but because it is also actively (and
openly) crafting a future. For example, the role of figures like the Trickster expose
ambivalences and perform a situated ethics, which contribute to processes of
understanding land (and spatial contexts) as “a living entity we live with and generate
knowledge through.”211 Perhaps the most notable and creative aspect of Indigenous
philosophy rests in the fact that it allows us to sit with contradiction, disagreement, and
difference, in order to understand the tensions that give rise to particular contexts, and to
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find individual solutions while simultaneously being attuned to the orientations of the
collective.

3.3.2 Indigenous Resurgent Practices as Withdrawal
I argue that resurgent practices are a form of withdrawal, in the sense that they engage in
a ‘turning away’ or perhaps a ‘turning into’ an engagement with the land. For example,
walking traditional paths and regenerating a relationship and understanding of the land
can give rise to Indigenous legal subjectivities that have been previously ignored.212 This
practice is ultimately performed with the objective of reorienting the Canadian settlercolonial lawscape, as it slowly reveals the atmospherics of the law by demonstrating how
these spaces, national parks or public spaces brim with Indigenous knowledge already. In
fact they always had, as Leanne Simpson powerfully reminds us,213 and the processes that
maintain the lawscape, or rather, have elevated it to the level of atmosphere have
contributed to a dissimulation of law’s violence through forgetting.214
This practice is indeed a path forward, and it inevitably brings the settler along with it as
it reorients lawscape, our spaces of living. These processes can be visible and invisible,
as Indigenous law can operate much in the same way as the common law does within the
lawscape,215 and these processes are necessarily experienced in a variety of ways
depending on the location and tension inherent in the assemblages that are withdrawing.
Some practices of resurgence may be more successful than others in shifting the
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lawscape, however, the form of engagement is the same throughout and it demonstrates
how processes of resurgence are necessary to the project of reconciliation. Indeed, as
Borrows noted, resurgence and reconciliation are inextricably linked, not in the sense of a
process of recognition, but in the sense that there is a shift in the material contexts of
existence, facilitated through resurgence, that will inevitably shift the settler-colonial
system. Therefore, I do not believe his project operates to the exclusion of the projects of
those who are interested in more radical aspects of resurgent practice, like Simpson or
Coulthard.
Yet, resurgent practice also signals a distinctive relationship to the land, and an important
step in claiming Indigenous sovereignty is to understand it through the lens of coexistence rather than the lens of ownership. A different understanding of property must
emerge in order to frame the legal subject in this case, which is the reason why I return to
this problem, and why the relationship to spatiality and land is an important one.216 The
lawscape is shifting, re-arranging, and yet, influencing other lawscapes’ reorientations.
As I mentioned before, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, as well as Russi, note spatial
justice’s relationship to Indigenous practices and the idea of co-extensive relationship
between land and law, specifically through the well-known example of the ‘songlines’
performed by particular Australian Indigenous peoples.217 It is easier to single out these
practices as forms of understanding the law through its material performance rather than
only its abstract form. The regeneration of law and land requires a withdrawal from a
colonial lawscape, in order to expose what has always been there.218
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3.3.3 Performing Spatial Justice through Indigenous Resurgence
Spatial justice, and the onto-epistemological framework within which it has been
structured, presents an alternative to the “ontological priority of the dualism” through the
idea of simultaneity and interstitionality.219 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos explains this
idea as follows:
“One, therefore, has to follow very closely what Brighenti means when he writes ‘the
interstice is rather the outcome of a composition of interactions and affections of
multiple parts that coexist in various ways within a given spatial situation’…Rather
than synthesis, an interstice is an emergence (which means, it lies beyond
prescription, controlled mechanics and systematic articulation of the result).”220
This notion of the ‘middle’ or the primacy of the interstice is important when we consider
a practice of Indigenous law which embraces the notion of conflict and ambiguity as
central to ethical practice. Thinking through this context as emergence allows us to
understand identity as situated in a context (in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ case this is
how an assemblage functions), yet capable of overcoming and shifting into new
formulations if necessary.221 To draw on Borrows, for example, direct action
operationalizes not necessarily as an oppositional mechanism, but rather as a productive
interstice. As we have seen in descriptions of the Uni’stot’en camp and blockade,
Indigenous leaders declare these sites as ‘gateways’ in order to highlight the fact that they
were sites of learning through resistance. This kind of practice allows us to understand
how spatial justice can be productive and transformative, while it is resistant. Although
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos urges us to remember that the radical potential of these
spaces can be “co-opted, overcoded and used in ways that go against the very idea of
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rhizome,”222 it is useful to consider the role of direct action and the application of
Indigenous law.
What I am proposing, then, is that if we want to understand a performance of spatial
justice, we must look to the work being done by Indigenous peoples in processes of
resurgence and reconciliation with the land and the more-than-human. This form of
performativity within the ambit of an assemblage or a collectivity, as one of many, helps
us understand how particular forms of identity and subjectivity can take shape without
having to rely on an essentialist position. The collective agency of assemblages reminds
us that subjectivities are always moving from the abstract to the concrete by necessity.
That law is abstract, in so far as we need it to be this way in order to understand how to
act, but its application is always material, always grounded. We cannot escape the
‘politics of locality’ as Braidotti would state, and a performance of spatial justice requires
first and foremost the recognition that this political dimension extends not only to the
human relations that unfold onto that locality, but how they unfold through it. This
process, as noted above by Robertson, requires attentiveness and slowing down, a process
of thinking through the stirrings of withdrawal, and noting the tensions at the interstices
of the assemblage.
As Jill Stauffer notes, there is a tendency to treat colonial settlement as a fait accompli,
instead of seeing it
“as a force that requires continual renewal, that might make clear not only that it
is up to all of us to choose between different possible outcomes, ‘but the
durability, consistency, scope and consolidation of the phenomena’ can be called
into question, and non-Natives can begin to ask how their everyday actions,
aspirations and goals contribute meaningfully to a continuing settler colonial
regime (Rifkin, 327).”223
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Drawing on Mark Rifkin’s work in Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday
Colonialism in the American Renaissance, Stauffer demonstrates, in effect, how the
atmospherics of the law, in this colonial legality, function to dissimulate law’s violence,
and the reproduction of forms of colonial violence through setter deference to the status
quo.
I note Stauffer’s work because performing spatial justice is not necessarily a process that
befalls Indigenous peoples to the exclusion of the settler, or that the burden of undoing
Canada’s colonial present is solely within the hands of Indigenous peoples in Canada. A
tilted continuum reflects the inherent power relations within assemblage formations and
within the lawscape, however, through withdrawal, bodies have the ability to shift the
parameters of the assemblage. By framing agency in this manner there is a break in
oppositional thinking to suggest that the ability to resist or withdraw is a conative
mechanism that is available to all agents, including the more-than-human, and it can be
effected through allegiances and complicity with other assemblaging actors in order to
effectively produce transformative change.

3.4
Rupturing the Lawscape through Indigenous
Resurgence
In the following section I will discuss two examples of how it is that we can approach a
practice of spatial justice, or an affirmative ethical relation, which I believe demonstrate
how the lawscape is ruptured and a glimmer of spatial justice is revealed. Both of these
examples are situated within a legal context, as they reveal the tension between
Indigenous law and Canadian legal systems. The first example is an analysis of a
performance art piece by Rebecca Belmore, entitled Facing the Monumental, which took
place on Canada Day in 2012 in Queen’s Park, in front of the Legislative Assembly of
Ontario. It was through Leanne Simpson’s re-telling of this event224 that I first understood
what performing spatial justice may look like, and the reason why I thought it was
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important to think about it in relation to Indigenous law and practices of resurgence. In
the second example, I wanted to consider a more well-known spatial context for
Indigenous resistance, the blockade. Given the recent news coverage of the protests at the
Unist’ot’en homestead, as well as these First Nations’ rich history of resistance and
successful transformation of the Canadian common law system,225 I thought it would be a
productive case-study for this project.

3.4.1 Rebecca Belmore’s Facing the Monumental (2012)
Rebecca Belmore’s performance art piece, Facing the Monumental is an example of
resurgence, as well as a lesson in Indigenous law. By drawing on Indigenous traditions,
through the inclusion of Mitigomizh, an old oak tree, as a central part of the performance,
Belmore produces a reorientation of the lawscape of Queen’s Park. The outcome of this
action is to reveal the depth and source of Indigenous knowledge present in a part of the
city that otherwise seems to brim with the legal authority of the colonial state.
As I draw my knowledge of this event from a description provided by Leanne
Betasamosake Simpson, I have included her re-telling of this performance below:
“The site of Belmore’s performance was Queen’s Park, in the expanse of a large,
old oak tree, Mitigomizh, in our language.
There were four pots of Nibi (water), and three large plastic bottles of water
marking the front of the space, telling me that this performance was going to be
about women. Nibi within Anishinaabeg philosophy carries within it many
complex teachings and it is also a strong reference to women. There are four
female spirits responsible for the water in the oceans, the fresh water, the water in
the sky and the water within our bodies. Nibi is the responsibility of women. Nibi
is women’s sovereignty.
Belmore began by leading her three shkaabewisag (helpers) around the
Mitigomizh that would become the focal point for the work. Over the next hour,
large sheets of brown kraft paper were unrolled, moistened with spray bottles of
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water and carefully wrapped around the tree over and over. They used Nibi to
hold the sheets together.
At first, the tying of the brown paper around the tree seemed like a marker to me.
My attention was exclusively on Mitigomizh. It was the Elder, the Nokomis in the
park. I imagined the destruction Nokomis had witnessed over the course of her
life. I thought of all of the water held by her roots and in her body. I thought of all
the black oak trees, and black oak savannas that are no longer in Mississauga
territory. I noticed the hordes of people walking by the tree, not noticing, on their
way to see the horse statue and the legislature. For an hour, we sat or stood,
talking and laughing quietly with our friends, eating and drinking and looking at
Nokomis, the old oak tree in the context of water. We watched as our water was
used to hold together the paper, methodically being wrapped around our
grandmother.
I remembered the murdered, the missing, the stolen, the erased. I remembered
generation after generation after generation after generation of our warrior
women. I remembered the generations yet to come.
When Mitigomizh was wrapped with the paper, it reminded me of a sexy,
strapless party dress, with ruching from top to bottom, and one asymmetrical strap
coming across her shoulder, where Belmore had attached the gown to the tree (by
initially throwing the paper tied to a yellow rope over a very tall branch).
Mitigomizh for me had become sexualized through no choice of her own. She was
aesthetically beautiful, but then she was also aesthetically beautiful before the
performance began. I had just forgotten to notice.
Then, one of the shkaabewis, dressed in her own black party dress with long and
with flowing black hair sat in the lap of Mitigomizh. Belmore took the wig off the
shkaabewis’s head and placed it over her faced. Then she continued to wrap the
shkaabewis into the tree with the paper. All the while, our sacred water was being
used as the glue. Eventually, our Anishnaabekwe disappeared.
Belmore then sat on the ground, in front of the pots of water, facing at the
Mitigomizh and the disappeared Anishnaabekwe.
That in and of itself was emotionally moving.
Then, the pinnacle.
The peace was suddenly and without warning shattered by the sound of gunfire. I
immediately thought of Oka, and the sounds of bullets terrorizing the pines. The
violence of the explosion vibrated through my body and the ground.
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The twenty one gun salute felt like the brutal targeting and assassination of
Indigenous women disguised as a salute and an honouring, which speaks to the
insidious and manipulative nature of colonialism, helping, reconciliation and the
dangers of perpetually placing Indigenous women in the context of victimhood…
The brilliance of Belmore’s work is always for me in its apparent nuanced
simplicity, that hours and days later becomes more and more complex. It is the
very best of Indigenous storytelling grounded in the very same process that have
brought meaning to the lives of our Ancestors – multi-dimensionality, repetition,
abstraction, metaphor and multiple sites of perception. In short, a multi-layered
conversation whose meaning shifts through time.
At the end of the performance, Belmore took the wig off of her shkaabewis’s face
(the lovely Cherish Blood, Blackfoot woman from the Blood reserve) and helped
her out of the wrappings and down off the tree. The image of Rebecca extending a
hand to Cherish and Cherish bursting through the bonds of 500 years of
oppression with a huge smile on her face is one of the images seared into my
memory from that day. The others, I’ll carry with me, and every time I pass by a
Mitigomizh, wherever I am in the world, I will now remember the fierce, gentle,
beautiful, nurturing nation building spirit of Indigenous women.
Rebecca Belmore takes (back) her (our) space (land) in the world and her work
compels me to take (back) my (our) space (land) in the world. Yesterday, she took
every Mitigomizh in my territory back, no matter where they grow. She
embedded the story of Anishinaabekwewag into their bark, and in doing so she
liberated the story of Indigenous women from the bonds of victimhood.
And for those gift, I say Chi’Miigwech to Rebecca, because today I feel slightly
more healed than I did yesterday.”226
By challenging the lawscape of Queen’s Park, Ontario’s legislative core, Belmore
recreates for her audience a site of Indigenous knowledge, and reminds them that it was
always there. As Simpson notes, Mitigomizh is an Elder, a Nokomis (grandmother), and
within its core she contains knowledge of this area that dates back generations. Therefore,
through the reorientation of the lawscape, a different legislative core is revealed, the site
of Indigenous knowledge. Belmore’s actions transcend the boundaries of art, into the
realm of law. This performance is a law-making movement and a political statement that
reveals a deference to (and care for) the more-than-human.
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Although Belmore’s work reorients the lawscape of Queen’s Park, whether that
reorientation can produce additional reorientations, and whether it can reverberate
beyond that one event to produce spatial justice remains to be seen. However, by
revealing the atmospherics of Queen’s Park, she demonstrated the sleight of hand
employed by settler colonialism in order to maintain its legal and political legitimacy
over the land. Arguably, performing spatial justice, and the effects of this kind of practice
hinge on an undoing of the practices of colonialism, by revealing them and by engaging
in other forms of action. The lawscape will always be part of how it is that law, space and
the body interact, however, it is possible to reorient the lawscape in order to create new
political and legal possibilities. Law and space, the tensions inherent in political contexts
and the complexity and messiness of these spaces is not something that disappears or can
be replaced by Indigenous law, as a different way to ‘do’ law. Rather, it attunes us to the
different layers and realities of law that have always been here, but have been
dissimulated away by particular concentrations of power.
In anticipation of Belmore’s exhibit at the Art Gallery of Ontario, Leanne Simpson
captures the spirit of the artist’s ethics when she describes her decolonial project:
“This is what colonialism in 2018 feels like. This relentless struggle of carrying
forward that which is meaningful, despite being bound, despite monumental
obstacles, is a struggle towards sky, towards freedom. The sharp focus on the
artist, the fortitude of concentration, her relentless determination and her sound as
she reaches the top, is affirmation. Yes, we will win. We already have.”227
A performance of spatial justice requires that we take stock of the asymmetries of power
that inform our positionality and our material and spatial configurations, and then that we
reconfigure the parameters of the assemblage in order to allow the possibility for
transformative change. What Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and others are suggesting is
that the reconfiguration takes place in and through the spaces of existence, that it is
limited and supported by these spaces. Belmore’s movements, her chosen site, the
partnership with the old oak tree, as well as her helpers allow us to understand that in
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order to reframe the legality of the spaces of everyday life, and to challenge power
relations, we need to engage with the more-than human agents that inform material
practice. Simpson herself draws attention to the importance of an engagement with space
and body:
“I’m drawn to the idea of transforming colonial space into decolonizing space,
and so I think about my body, my presence and my surroundings as material as
well…Belmore’s work is concerned with violence, but that it takes us elsewhere,
it doesn’t stay in the pain. It affirms our truths, but it is also generative.”228
By allowing us to consider the co-constitutivity of law and space at the level of the body,
legal geographers, and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos in particular, have challenged us to
consider a dimension of law that is often overlooked, one that is exercised with respect to
the limitations of the body, socio-legal spaces, and more importantly, those who form our
collective assemblages (human and more-than-human alike).

3.4.2 Wet’suwet’en Nation’s Unist’ot’en Camp and Blockade
The use of blockades in protests on traditional territories is a common form of direct
action utilized by Indigenous communities.229 It remains an effective and immediate way
of affirming Indigenous sovereignty within traditional territories. These are sites of
resistance, as they are physical barriers to external access, and they are also sites of
knowledge production. The Unist’ot’en camp provides a particularly important example
of how these places can advance Indigenous resurgence by acting as sites through which
to teach and engage with traditional Indigenous knowledge.230 The Unist’ot’en maintain
that the “homestead is not a protest or demonstration. [Their] clan is occupying and using
[its] traditional territory as it has for centuries.”231 The camp is an example of a practice
of spatial justice, as it demonstrates that these seemingly liminal and divisive spaces can
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actually lend themselves to productive and regenerative interactions. The Unist’ot’en
camp is an example of a resistant and productive activity, and it acts to reorient the
lawscape by opening up a space that brims with Indigenous sovereignty. The work being
undertaken by the Wet’suwet’en is also likely to impact and shift forms of practice in
other communities, leading to the reorientation of multiple lawscapes and creating the
possibility of spatial justice.

3.4.2.1

Background

Unist’ot’en clan is affiliated with the Knedebeas (Dark House) house group which is one
of thirteen house groups that form the lineage of the Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs, and
as a whole, operate under the name of the Wet’suwet’en Nation.232 According to
Wet’suwet’en Nation, the hereditary chiefs claim jurisdiction over the traditional territory
and the activities that take place on it, whereas the Wet’suwet’en First Nation, formed
under the Indian Act, 1876, has jurisdiction only over the operations of the band and
reserve.233 This important distinction demonstrates a substantial shift and definition of the
lawscapes within which these groups operate, as well as the more explicit relationship to
the more-than-human, advocated by the hereditary chiefs, who give more prominence to
their stewardship role.
The Unist’ot’en camp has been in place for more than a decade; it began as an antipipeline initiative.234 In the fall of 2018, after the Canadian government praised the
kicking-off of the Coastal Gaslink Pipeline, the Unist’ot’en camp and the Gidimt’en
checkpoint were re-introduced as sites of opposition in the larger Canadian national
discourse, and solidarity protests were held across the country. However, as I mentioned
above, what is oftentimes missing from the Canadian national discourse is the fact that
the Unist’ot’en camp is also a “home and a place of healing for Wet’suwet’en people”
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according to the Hereditary Chief of the Laksamshu Clan.235 The site is a place where
traditional knowledge is shared and regenerated, in particular with respect to healing
those affected by addiction, among other issues. It is a site that is perpetually engaging in
a process of un-doing the harmful effect of colonialism on the community.
The impact of Indigenous resurgence practices on the lives of the Wet’suwet’en is
undeniable, in particular through the re-establishment of a relationship with the land.236
As Leah Temper notes,
“Instead of appealing outwards, its aim is to create a space for what Coulthard (2014)
refers to as ‘self-recognition’ and Indigenous re-affirmation. In this newly reclaimed
space, the Unist’ot’en camp members have been able to assert their own legal
understandings, and to live their concept of justice through practice, through
enactment and through antagonistic politics that disrupt the economic and social logic
and production of settler-colonial power.”237
Therefore, this checkpoint, or as the camp members call it, “a gateway to understanding
truth and meaningful

ecolonization,”238 is a significant site where we can see spatial

justice not in a distributive sense, as a distribution of resources or territorial control, but
rather as a transformative mechanism that hinges, primarily, on re-establishing a distinct
relationship with the land. Then, the Unist’ot’en camp and the other checkpoints reflect
the mutual constitutivity of law and spatiality, the formation of a lawscape, one that is
capable of reflecting Indigenous legal frameworks beyond the relation with the Crown.

3.4.2.2

The ‘Rule of Law’ and Rupturing the Colonial Lawscape

The recent stand-off on Wet’suwet’en territory concluded in January 2019 with the
enforcement by Royal Canadian Mounted Police of an interim injunction obtained by

235

Justin Brake, “Government Document Calls Unist’ot’en Leader ‘Aboriginal Extremist,’” APTN
News, https://aptnnews.ca/2018/12/03/government-document-calls-unistoten-leader-aboriginal-extremist/
(accessed April 10, 2019).
236

Ibid.

237

Temper, 107.

238

Ibid., 108.

91

Coastal Gaslink Pipeline Ltd, which resulted in the arrest of 14 individuals.239 The
intervention has been justified through the application of the ‘rule of law’, or simply,
compliance with the court order that granted the injunction. However, as it has been
stated elsewhere, this concept, which is supposed to reflect order and fairness in a legal
system, instead reflects the imposition of a colonial lawscape. The only means through
which to stop or reverse this process is through forms of resurgence and reconciliation,
and the slow recalibration of not only territory, but of the ways in which the relationship
to land and the more-than-human is reframed. In this sense, Temper’s notion of
environmental justice is tangential with spatial justice.
The invocation of the ‘rule of law’ in this case reminds me of PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos’ own claim for an apolitical relationship between law and spatiality,
specifically stemming from the desire to understand law’s universal, even and fair
application, or more accurately, the fact that law dispenses violence against all,
equally.240 The example presented in the case of the Wet’suwet’en is a reminder that
there is no such thing as fair or even application of the law, and that the co-constitutivity
of law and spatiality, and its reorientation is inherently political. Or rather, that it is not
particularly helpful to think of justice, indeed spatial justice, without recognizing the
political extensions that rest at its core.

3.5

Conclusion

Indigenous resurgent practices demonstrate how forms of political and legal engagement
can unfold through cooperation with the land and the more-than-human, demonstrating a
substantial way through which the lawscape can be reoriented and spatial justice
performed. These sites of engagement are legally affirmative and politically resistant.
Although an engagement with the non-human or the more-than-human is central to these
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processes, we can note the shifting lawscape as these agents are positioned at the center
of legal and political engagement. Laws gain liveliness (as lifeways) and sustain the
possibility of politics (contradiction) through negotiation. This chapter demonstrated
what an engaged practice of spatial justice may look like, and how this form of
engagement can lead the way to understanding more attuned and complex political
responses to significant legal questions.
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Conclusion

4

Conclusion

This project stemmed from an interest in the relationship between law and spatiality, as
well as its implications with respect to legal subjectivity and nonhuman legal agency. A
central question for this study is whether politics has a place in PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos’ theory of spatial justice, and how it is that we may think of politics and
social justice in a posthumanist context. By drawing out the Deleuzo-Guattarian
foundations of spatial justice, and by comparing the concept of withdrawal to Indigenous
resurgence, I demonstrated that there is a political praxis at the core of this theory through
the process of performing spatial justice. Moving forward, I suggest that we consider how
it is that Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ concept of spatial justice fits into a discussion
about posthumanist social justice. Rosi Braidotti noted that there is a pressing need to
consider the implications of a posthumanist ethics and what role posthumanism can play
in discussions of social justice moving forward, and I believe spatial justice can act as a
starting point.
This concept also provides critical legal theorists interested in the nonhuman and legal
subjectivity with a theoretical perspective that shifts beyond traditional rights discourses.
Legal practice is already contending with increasing questions about novel legal subjects,
like the environment or animals, and the influence of technological innovation, especially
with respect to artificial intelligence (AI). Questions regarding these ethical relationships
have only recently gained momentum within the ambit of legal theory. Andreas
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theory of spatial justice should be considered closely in
this context as well. In particular, it would be interesting to see how the concepts that
form this theory of spatial justice, like the lawscape and atmosphere, can be applied in a
digital/virtual context. At the early stages of writing, I considered focusing my third
chapter on the use of blockchain technology as a means of providing stateless Rohingya
individuals with an alternative form of citizenship through the introduction of a form of
digital identity. How would this project challenge the subjective and spatial positioning
of the citizen? How will AI be used in relation to these digital identities, and what spatial
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and material implications might arise? Where will there be opportunities to reorient the
lawscape and perform spatial justice in relation (and through) the virtual realm?
As well, as a starting point for these forays into novel legal subjects, I propose a more
robust engagement with Indigenous legal philosophy as it can re-shape our understanding
of a relationship with the natural environment. As well, I believe that there are
opportunities for thinking about posthumanism alongside the relational philosophies that
emerge from Indigenous thought, in particular with respect to the practice of spatial
justice. As I noted in the thesis, and as others have argued, there is an unacknowledged
debt to Indigenous knowledge in posthumanist thought, or at least there is a gap in
theoretical scholarship that engages more pointedly with these two theoretical fields.
Although through my research I noted an overlap in these two fields with respect to
spatiality, Indigenous theoretical perspectives and the more-than-human, I believe that a
deeper engagement is necessary. Furthermore, conventional forms of legal practice would
benefit from the influence and input of Indigenous legal traditions, beyond questions of
environmentalism or constitutionalism. Although spatial justice provides an entry point
into this discussion, it would be useful to understand the deeper implications Indigenous
legal traditions could have on the common law as well.

95

Bibliography
Alfred, Taiaiake, and Jeff Corntassel. “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against
Contemporary Colonialism,” in Government and Opposition 40 (2005): 597-614.
Asch, Michael, John Borrows and James Tully, editors. Resurgence and Reconciliation:
Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2018.
Barad, Karen. “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter
Comes to Matter,” in Signs 28 (2003): 802-803. DOI: 10.1086/345321.
Blomley, Nicholas K. “Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence: The Frontier, the
Survey, and the Grid.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 93
(2003): 121-141. DOI: 10.1111/1467-8306.93109.
Blomley, Nicholas K. and Janet C. Sturgeon. “Property as Abstraction.” International
Journal of Urban Regional Research 33 (June 2009): 564-6. DOI: 10.1111/j.
1468-2427.2009.00882.x.
Blomley, Nicholas K. and Joel C. Bakan. “Spacing Out: Towards a Critical Geography of
Law.” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 30 (1992): 661-690. https://digitalcommons.
osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol30/iss3/9.
Borrows, John. Canada’s Indigenous Constitution. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2010.
Borrows, John. Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s Guide. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2010.
Borrows, John. “Earth-Bound: Indigenous Resurgence and Environmental
Reconciliation,” in Resurgence and Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations
and Earth Teachings edited by Michael Asch, John Borrows and James Tully.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018.
Borrows, John and James Tully, “Introduction,” in Resurgence and Reconciliation:
Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings eds. Michael Asch, John
Borrows and James Tully. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018.

Borrows, John. Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2016.

96

Braidotti, Rosi. “Four Theses on Posthuman Feminism,” in Anthropocene Feminism
edited by Richard Grusin. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017.
Brake, Justin. “Government Document Calls Unist’ot’en Leader ‘Aboriginal Extremist.’”
APTN News. https://aptnnews.ca/2018/12/03/government-document-callsunistoten-leader-aboriginal-extremist/ (accessed April 10, 2019).
Braverman, Irus, editor. Animals, Biopolitics, Law: Lively Legalities. New York:
Routledge, 2016.
Braverman, Irus, Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney and Alexander Kedar, editors. The
Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2014.
Brown, Katrina M., Frode Flemsaeter, Katrina Ronningen. “More-than-human
geographies of property: Moving Towards Spatial Justice with Response-ability,”
in Geoforum 99 (2019): 54-62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.12.012.
Casey, Edward S. The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History. Los Angeles: The
University of California Press, 1998.
Chouinard, Vera. “Geography, Law and Legal Struggles: Which Ways Ahead?” Progress
in Human Geography 18 (1994): 417. DOI: 10.1177/030913259401800401.
Coulthard, Glen Sean. Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of
Recognition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014.
Correia, Joel E. “Indigenous Rights at a Crossroads: Territorial Struggles, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, and Legal Geographies of Liminality,” in
Geoforum 97 (2018): 73-83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.10.013.
Darnell, Regna. “Reconciliation, Resurgence and Revitalization: Collaborative Research
Protocols with Contemporary First Nations Communities,” in Resurgence and
Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings edited by
Michael Asch, John Borrows and James Tully. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2018.
De Bloois, Joost. “A Critical Europe Can Do It!: Interview with Rosi Braidotti,” in
Critical Theory at a Crossroads: Conversations on Resistance in Times of Crisis,
edited by Stijn De Cauwer. New York: University of Columbia Press, 2018.
DeBlouis, Joost. “Neoliberalism Against the Promise of Modernity: Interview with
Wendy Brown,” in Critical Theory at Crossroads: Conversations on Resistance,
edited by Stijn DeCauwer. New York: University of Columbia Press, 2018.

97

DeCauwer, Stijn, editor. Critical Theory at a Crossroads: Conversations on Resistance in
Times of Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018.
Delaney, David. The Spatial, the Legal and the Pragmatics of World-Making:
Nomospheric Investigations. New York: Routledge, 2010.
Delaney, David. “Legal Geography I: Constitutivities, Complexities, and Contingencies,”
Progress in Human Geography 39 (2014): 96-102. DOI: 10.1177/0309132514527
035.
Delaney, David. “Legal Geography II: Discerning Injustice,” Progress in Human
Geography 40 (2016): 267-274. DOI: 10.1177/0309132515571725.
Delaney, David. “Legal Geography III: New Worlds, New Convergences,” Progress in
Human Geography 41 (2017): 667-675. DOI: 10.1177/0309132516650354.
Deleuze, Gilles. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. New York: Continuum, 2006.
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,
translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
Ducklow, Zoe. “Nine Things You Need to Know about the Unist’ot’en Blockade.” The
Tyee. https://thetyee.ca/ Analysis/2019/01/08/LNG-Pipeline-Unistoten-Blockade/
(accessed April 10, 2019).
Harvey, David. Social Justice and the City: Revised Edition. Athens, Georgia: The
University of Georgia Press, 2009.
Kam’ayaam/Chachim’multhnii (Cliff Atleo, Jr.). “Red Skin, White Masks: A Review,” in
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education and Society 3 (2014): 187-194.
Keenan, Sarah. Subversive Property: Law and the Production of Spaces of Belonging.
London: Routledge, 2015.
Kung, Eugene and Gavin Smith. “The Unist’ot’en Stand-off: How Canada’s ‘prove-it’
mentality undermines reconciliation.” West Coast Environmental Law
https://www.wcel.org/blog/unistoten-stand-how-canadas-prove-it-mentalityundermines-reconciliation (accessed April 10, 2019).
Lefebvre, Henri. The Production of Space. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1991.
Lloyd, Moya. Beyond Identity Politics: Feminism, Power and Politics. London: Sage
Publications, 2005.
Lunning, Frenchy. “Allure and Abjection: The Possible Potential of Severed Qualities,”

98

in Object-Oriented Feminism, edited by Katherine Behar. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2016.
Manning, Dolleen Tisawii’ashii. “Mnidoo-Worlding: Merleau-Ponty and Anishinaabe
Philosophical Translations.” PhD diss., Western University, 2017.
Mills, Aaron. “Rooted Constitutionalism: Growing Political Community,” in Resurgence
and Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings edited by
Michael Asch, John Borrows and James Tully. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2018.
Mossman, Mary Jane and Phillip Girard. Property Law: Cases and Commentary, 3rd ed.
Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2014.
Murdock, Esme G. “Storied with Land: ‘transitional justice’ on Indigenous Lands,” in
Journal of Global Ethics 14 (2018): 232-239. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.
2018.1516692.
Nedelsky, Jennifer. Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Ojalammi, Sanna and Nicholas Blomley. “Dancing with Wolves: Making Legal Territory
in a More-Than-Human World.” in Geoforum 62 (2015): 51-60, doi: 10.1016/j.
geoforum.2015.03.022.
Patchett, Emma. “La Zone: In/habitation in the Itinerant City,” in Global Jurist 15 (2015):
175-194. DOI: 10.1515/gj-2014-0016.
Patton, Paul. Deleuze and the Political. New York: Routledge, 2000.
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Andreas. “Critical Autopoiesis and the Materiality of
Law” in International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 27 (2014): 389-418. DOI:
10.1007/s11196-013-9328-7.
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Andreas. Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere.
New York: Routledge, 2015.
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Andreas. “Lively Agency: Life and Law in the
Anthropocene,” in Animals, Biopolitics, Law: Lively Legalities, edited by Irus
Braverman. New York: Routledge, 2016.
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Andreas. “Spatial Justice in the Lawscape” in Revista
Brasileira de Sociologia do Direito 5 (2018): 100-121. DOI: 10.21910/rbsd.v5
n1.2018.222.
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Andreas. “And for Law: Why Space Cannot be

99

Understood Without Law,” Law, Culture, and the Humanities 1 (2018).
Robertson, Sean. “Natives Making Space: The Softwood Lumber Dispute and the Legal
Geographies of Indigenous Property Rights,” in Geoforum 61 (2015) 138-147.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.03.001.
Robertson, Sean. “Thinking of the Land in That Way: Indigenous Sovereignty and the
Spatial Politics of Attentiveness at Skwelkwek’welt,” in Social and Cultural
Geography 18 (2017): 178-200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2016.
1164230.
Russi, Luigi. “‘a Legge d’‘o Munno – Three Sketches on Spatial Justice,” in Global
Jurist 16 (2016): 1-25. DOI: 10.1515/gj-2015-0003.
Simpson, Leanne Betasamosake. As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom
Through Radical Resistance. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017.
Simpson, Leanne Betasamosake. “Canada Day, Rebecca Belmore and Me,” Leanne
Simpson, https://www.leannesimpson.ca/writings/canada-day-rebecca-belmoreme (accessed: April 7, 2019).
Simpson, Leanne Betasamosake. “I Am the Artist Amongst My People,” Canadianart
https://canadianart.ca/features/i-am-the-artist-amongst-my-people/ (accessed:
March 25, 2019).
Soja, Edward W. Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social
Theory. New York: Verso Books, 1989.
Soja, Edward W. Seeking Spatial Justice. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2010.
Starblanket, Gina and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark. “Towards a Relational Paradigm –
Four Points for Consideration: Knowledge, Gender, Land and Modernity,” in
Resurgence and Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth
Teachings edited by Michael Asch, John Borrows and James Tully. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2018.
Stauffer, Jill. “Disrupting ‘All the Familiar Geometry’: Drones, Settler Colonialism, and
Nasser Hussain’s Difficult Questions.” Law, Culture and the Humanities,
(December 2017). DOI: 10.1177/1743872117750060.
Temper, Leah. “Blocking Pipelines, Unsettling Environmental Justice: From Rights of
Nature to Responsibility to Territory,” in Local Environment 24 (2019): 94-112.
Tully, James. “Reconciliation Here on Earth,” in Resurgence and Reconciliation:

100

Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings edited by Michael Asch, John
Borrows and James Tully. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018.
Valverde, Mariana. Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance. New
York: Routledge, 2015.
Forrest Wade Young, “Rapa Nui,” in The Contemporary Pacific 29 (2017): 173-18.
http://www.uhpress.hawaii.edu.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca.

101

Curriculum Vitae
Name:

Ramona Anca Radu

Post-secondary
Education and
Degrees:

Huron University College at Western University
London, Ontario, Canada
2007-2011 Hons. B.A.
Osgoode Hall University at York University
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
2013-2016 J.D.

Honours and
Awards:

Ontario Graduate Scholarship
2012-2013

Related Work
Experience

Research Assistant
Western University
2011-2012
Teaching Assistant
Western University
2012-2013

